Law School research gets glowing quote in the Financial Times
Thu 1 May 2014
Emilios’ paper, co-authored with Jay Cullen, was first presented at a Berkeley conference last year and then at a Harvard seminar and stirred up vivid debate, as it challenges academic and regulatory orthodoxy in the realm of financial stability reform.
It holds that excessive bank leverage creates agency and governance costs that may not be resolved through regulation of bankers’ pay. Career security and advancement concerns make management as much susceptible to shareholder pressure to maximize returns by taking excessive risks on debt-fuelled balance sheets as perverse compensation incentives. Of course, such behaviour undermines the stability of financial institutions and of the banking system as a whole. Therefore, well calibrated controls of bank leverage rather than government intervention in private contracting is the key to a safer banking sector.
The full Financial Times article can be found here.
Emilios’ paper can be downloaded free of charge here.