ELTRG Seminar: Kevin Tobia (Georgetown University)- ‘Experimental Jurisprudence’
Location:
Moot Court Room,
Old College
Date/time
Thu 10 April 2025
14:00-16:00
This is a seminar organised by the Edinburgh Legal Theory Research Group. The speaker Kevin Tobia, from Georgetown University, will be presenting a chapter from his book ‘Experimental Jurisprudence’.
Our seminars consist of a 30-minute presentation given by the author, followed by a 60 to 90-minute Q&A. This is not a pre-read event, but the paper will be circulated beforehand through our mailing list. To subscribe, please send an email to edinburgh.legal.theory@gmail.com.
Author bio: Kevin Tobia is an Associate Professor of Law and Philosophy (by courtesy) at Georgetown. Professor Tobia’s research addresses topics in legal interpretation and jurisprudence. Tobia received a B.A., summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, in Philosophy, Mathematics, and Cognitive Science from Rutgers University; a B.Phil. (M.A.) with distinction from Oxford as an Ertegun Scholar in the Humanities; and a J.D. and Ph.D. in philosophy with distinction from Yale. Professor Tobia’s scholarship has been awarded the Yale Law School Felix S. Cohen prize for legal philosophy and the AALS Section on Jurisprudence “Future Promise Award” for scholarship in legal philosophy. His book Experimental Jurisprudence is forthcoming with Cambridge University Press.
Abstract: The proposal is to present a chapter from my in-progress book Experimental Jurisprudence. The book introduces and defends “experimental jurisprudence,” a growing field of legal philosophy that applies (a) empirical methods to (b) questions of jurisprudence or legal philosophy. These questions include: How should judges interpret statutes, are evil laws really laws, how does the legal notion of causation relate to the ordinary notion of causation, and who is law’s “reasonable person"? The book argues that, in exploring these questions, traditional legal philosophy regularly makes claims about (ordinary) people’s shared intuitions. Moreover, empirical methods illuminate intuitions’ sources and whether they are shared among diverse populations. The book responds to various objections to its proposal, including the objection that legal philosophy is concerned with the intuitions of legal officials or experts—not the intuitions of laypeople that experimental jurisprudence surveys often examine. Beyond its defense of experimental jurisprudence, the book seeks to stimulate broader discussion about legal philosophy’s nature, aims, and methodology.