

INSTRUMENTAL INTERNATIONALISM, 1941–1943


THE WORLD WAS A DANGEROUS PLACE IN which America had to take up arms: no one needed to convince Edward Mead Earle of that. Before Henry Kissinger, Hans Morgenthau, and a cavalcade of émigré realpolitikers transplanted the dark lessons of Weimar democracy to the United States, academics like Earle, born and raised in New York City, readied the soil.¹ In the mid-1930s Earle established a “grand strategy” seminar in Princeton, New Jersey, while in New Haven ambitious scholars set up the Yale Institute for International Studies. Although both institutes dedicated themselves to the study of power politics, only after the fall of France did the strategists morph into advocates of U.S. global supremacy and critics of the bugaboo they called isolationism. Earle, in particular, became a full-throated interventionist spokesman, taking his message to the pages of *Political Science Quarterly* and *Ladies’ Home Journal* alike. He told Americans to attain a “primacy of our own” in order to preserve a “universal concept of international order,” previously underwritten by British arms.²

The Yale Institute, meanwhile, produced the most elaborate geopolitical argument against hemisphere defense and for U.S. participation in the power balances of Europe and Asia. This was Nicholas J. Spykman’s *America’s Strategy in World Politics*, published in 1942 but mostly written in the year after the fall of France.³ Spykman contended that German and Japanese domination of Eurasia would deprive the United States of the raw materials it

needed for industrial military production. He also maintained that this specific threat merely proved a general truth. "States," he wrote, "can survive only by constant devotion to power politics." After the present war, Spykman wanted the United States to police Europe and Asia as Britain had formerly done, continually intervening with superior force to ensure an acceptable political equilibrium. The irrelevance of a universal organization like the League of Nations almost went without saying. At most, Spykman envisioned a number of separate regional councils or a great-power conclave along the lines of the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe.⁴

In so arguing, the academic strategists occupied the vanguard of foreign policy thinking in 1940 and 1941. Yet in another respect they marched increasingly out of step with private planners and public intellectuals. Earle and Spykman used power politics not only as a framework of analysis but also as a language of legitimation. They wanted the populace to accept the same severe conclusions they had drawn. Blaming liberalism for imbuing Americans with an excessive faith in law, morality, and world organization, Earle and Spykman attempted to recast power politics as the most American of pursuits. Just as the U.S. founders had sought to check and balance power domestically, they argued, so would balanced power prevent tyranny internationally.⁵ Yet insofar as the strategists envisioned the United States as the preeminent balancer, they implied that American power might constitute a tyranny. Spykman did little to dispel this implication. He appraised U.S. behavior in the Western Hemisphere harshly; "our so-called painless imperialism has seemed painless only to us," he wrote. And he stated baldly that Adolf Hitler was seeking the kind of *Lebensraum* in Europe that the United States had long enjoyed in the Americas.⁶ The academic strategists, however attuned to the need for public legitimation, offered a bleak message: seek maximum power, imperialistic though it may be.

Quincy Wright thought this "realism" (as it was just coming to be called) would never work. Already in August 1940, Wright wrote Earle to explain why—in the process articulating a new rationale for world organization. Although he claimed the mantle of Wilsonianism, Wright did not express confidence that power politics could and should be overcome. He heartily approved of Earle's assault on "isolationism," and at that moment Wright was struggling to work out his own preferred vision of world order in the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP). Instead Wright outstrategized the strategist, arguing that Earle's methods subverted his aims. The American public, Wright wrote, would never agree to play power politics,



This propaganda poster boasts that America's increased military production has set it on the path to victory in World War II. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration.

a system of shifting alliances suited to the princes of seventeenth-century Europe. "The United States is, I think, positively precluded from the balance-of-power politics with its existing constitutional and democratic structure," he judged.⁷ The only *practical* alternative to isolationism, the only way to ensure that Americans would permanently punch their weight on a global basis,

was world organization. Without quite giving up on the internationalist dream of a peaceful and lawful world, Wright developed an instrumental rationale for what remained of the Wilsonian program. Absent international organization, America could not lead the world. If only to secure its own supremacy, Wright's logic implied, the United States had to claim the mantle of internationalism—to appear, at least, to organize world politics around principles other than power alone.

Wright was prescient. At the time he originally wrote to Earle, and for twelve months more, most officials and intellectuals followed the academic strategists in dismissing any idea of a new League of Nations. They did envision an international body of a different kind—an intimate and exclusive partnership among the Anglophone nations. Yet such American-British hegemony seemed appealing because it promised to provide international order as no wider formula could. Whether endorsing an empire of the Anglo-Saxon race or the century of the common man, or some of each, U.S. policy elites were one in seeking to participate in—indeed to dominate—power politics and no longer to transcend it through universal methods. Through most of 1941, world supremacy and world organization appeared to preclude one another. Particularist and universalist prescriptions remained poles apart.

It was Wright the idealist who anticipated the eminently realistic logic by which world organization came to appear consistent with, even essential to, U.S. supremacy. Beginning in the second half of 1941, advocates of supremacy perceived the force of Wright's criticism and the appeal of his solution. They worried that the primacy of America alone would appear as brute domination. U.S. supremacy looked even more imperialistic if it were exercised in tandem with Britain, no matter how tenderly its supporters described the traditions of Anglo-Saxon law and liberty. It would look that way first of all to non-Anglo powers, especially the Soviet Union. Surprised when the Nazis attacked the Soviets in June 1941, and again when the Red Army proved its mettle over the following months, American planners started to envision the Soviet Union as a potentially significant postwar player, one that might seek to counter blatant American-British hegemony.

Yet why not simply bring the Soviet Union into the fold, reviving the Concert of Europe for the twentieth-century great powers? Why include small states, roundly dismissed as obstacles to international order? Wright had suggested the answer: U.S. global supremacy would otherwise offend Americans themselves. It was principally to legitimate U.S. supremacy do-

mestically that international organization entered the agenda in late 1941 and 1942. By working through a universal body, with every nation a member, the United States would seem to lead an enlightened world order, bound by rules of law and respecting the equality of others. This, at any rate, was the lesson that interventionist elites drew from their own self-diagnosed failure to pitch supremacy without organization. By 1942 even Earle was criticizing Spykman's book for advocating "irresponsible force, irresponsibly controlled."⁸ Arnold Wolfers of the Yale Institute likewise wondered whether, "given the temper of the American people, it may even prove impossible to organize Anglo-American cooperation . . . except under the more universal auspices of some league or association of powers."⁹ Members of both Earle's seminar and the Yale Institute went on to advise the U.S. government to create the United Nations (U.N.).¹⁰

Solving the problem of legitimacy, however, raised a further challenge: how to reconcile the practice of power politics with the appearance of transcending it. Postwar planners felt the contradiction keenly. Through most of 1942 they groped for some way to square the circle, hoping to yoke world supremacy to world organization without yet knowing how to do so or whether it could, in fact, be done. In this they followed the path not so much of Woodrow Wilson and his *Inquiry* as of British prime minister David Lloyd George and his War Cabinet, which during World War I had sought to reconcile the popular demand for a league of nations with the imperatives of British world leadership.¹¹

To the extent that scholars have tried to explain why the United States opted to create a world organization, they have missed the domestic concern to which the U.N. was primarily addressed. Historians both celebratory and critical foreground the kind of international environment that the U.N. was intended to produce: in one version, a peaceful, open, rules-based order; in another, a world safe for capitalism.¹² Political scientists, too, tend to privilege international benefits in debating why states cooperate with international organizations: "realists" minimize the significance of such organizations whereas "liberal institutionalists" counter that organizations help states to collaborate with each other and coordinate their interests.¹³ Both camps ascribe to states a narrow rationality determined by the international system and insulated from domestic political contestation and ideological formations.¹⁴ Neither can explain why the United States wanted the U.N. in the first place—why, amid a ferocious war, officials and intellectuals preoccupied themselves with the problem of domestic legitimacy and developed a new

concept of internationalism, embodied in a new international organization, as the solution.

The Inadequacies of the Anglosphere

Through the first half of 1941, a chasm separated U.S. global supremacy and universal world organization as postwar possibilities. In the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), postwar planners took turns lambasting the moribund League of Nations, which they associated with pacifism.¹⁵ Arthur Sweetser and James Shotwell, the two greatest supporters of the League system within the CFR's Political Group, were the nonexceptions that proved the rule. Sweetser, previously a fixture in the Secretariat and Information Section of the League, declined to defend the organization's relevance in matters of high politics, arguing only to retain the financial and economic experts assembled under its auspices.¹⁶ Shotwell showed less enthusiasm still. Despite chairing CSOP, he concluded it was "far better to emphasize the liberties of mankind against the menace of a Gestapo and let the problems of international government work themselves out later."¹⁷ The CFR planners determined that any future world organization would have to follow a "transitional period" of unspecified duration after the war.

Over the second half of the year, however, global supremacy and international organization came together, less because the latter gained in appeal than because the former lost some of its own. At first, welcome developments in the war compelled planners to consider broadening their blueprint for an exclusive partnership between the United States and the British Commonwealth, in that order. As Great Britain defended its home isles against the Luftwaffe and received mounting Lend-Lease aid, planners began to imagine that Nazi conquests could be rolled back within Europe rather than merely contained to the Continent and parts of North Africa and the Middle East. Perhaps the United States could avert a postwar cold war that would pit the Anglosphere against the Nazis' New Order. Instead it could usher in a unified "one world," as Wendell Willkie would title his best-selling travelogue two years later.¹⁸ Such an outcome seemed far from assured, but its mere plausibility sufficed to compel the CFR planners to apply the globalist lessons of the fall of France on a truly global scale. Yet expanding the U.S.-led order did not automatically imply expanding international institutions beyond American-British control. The U.N. would emerge as a second-best option, called forth to secure legitimacy at home as much as abroad.

Toward One World, under America and Britain

The CFR's Economic and Financial Group exemplified one set of concerns that drove the Grand Area Anglosphere to expand. Since the fall of France, the economists had developed comprehensive recommendations for postwar U.S. foreign policy by assessing the requirements of a liberal-capitalist international economy in the context of zero-sum geopolitical competition with a German-dominated Europe. In September 1940 they had devised the Grand Area, an Anglo-led, politically and economically integrated combination of the Western Hemisphere and the British Empire. On the basis of prewar trade patterns, they calculated the Grand Area to provide the minimum "elbow room" needed to maintain U.S. hegemony and liberal capitalism in the Western Hemisphere and economic superiority over a German-dominated Europe.¹⁹ This integrated political-military-economic sphere—a kind of global liberal autarky—could absorb export surpluses through trade and ensure adequate raw materials for defense.

In 1941 the Grand Area grew grander as the planners sought first to increase the American-British advantage over Nazi Europe and then to incorporate Europe itself into the U.S.-led order. The Economic and Financial Group clarified that the Grand Area contained swaths of Africa and Asia, including the whole of the "British Commonwealth and Empire, the Dutch East Indies, China, and Japan."²⁰ Its members also insisted that the Nazis should be prevented from gaining control of the Near East and North Africa, areas previously thought to be lost causes, and of the Soviet Union, which had been left out. By May the Grand Area was growing from a self-contained economic unit into what planners now called a "nucleus" of an integrated world economy.²¹ Within six months, U.S. strategy in the prospective cold war with Nazi Germany advanced from containment to rollback, to use the terminology of the following decade.

Rather than redo their studies, the economic planners moved their goalposts. They shifted from minimum requirements to maximal objectives, casting the latter in the language of necessity. Quietly contradicting the group's original calculations, economist Winfield Riefler concluded that "the existence of the German 'grand area,'" confined to Europe, "would be fundamentally incompatible with the American economic system."²² Riefler would soon be appointed as Vice President Henry Wallace's chief adviser on the Economic Defense Board, and his views found support elsewhere in the government.²³ Lynn Edminster, a special adviser to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, publicly announced in May that the United States sought to "establish and maintain

the largest possible sphere in the world within which trade and other economic relations can be conducted on the basis of liberal principles."²⁴ Having already determined, after France fell, that the United States needed to lead a globe-spanning order, U.S. elites sought every opportunity to enlarge the Grand Area. After mid-June, the CFR planners ceased to discuss the Grand Area except as a stopgap measure that awaited the incorporation of Europe after a full Nazi defeat.²⁵ Thus the traditional American preference for global intercourse overtook the emergency planning for liberal autarky, but the former bore the mark of the latter: global intercourse now entailed global armed policing.

Seeking universal economic integration, the planners considered creating international institutions that would lubricate global capitalism. As several noted, because of the trend toward the governmental direction of economic processes, even a liberal economic order would require some degree of coordination by political authorities.²⁶ From September to December 1941, the Economic and Financial Group formulated plans for an international currency stabilization and lending authority in which governments would cooperate to finance the reconstruction of industrial economies and the development of what it termed backward areas. Three years later, this authority became the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, established at the Bretton Woods conference in New Hampshire. The outcome owed partly to the direct efforts of the Economic and Financial group's cochairmen, Alvin Hansen and Jacob Viner, who were wartime advisers on the Federal Reserve Board and in the Treasury Department, respectively, and influenced the leading official negotiators at Bretton Woods, John Maynard Keynes for the United Kingdom and Harry Dexter White for the United States.²⁷ The work of the CFR planners constitutes one point of origin of the postwar monetary and financial system and the U.S. commitment to reconstruction and development.²⁸

On balance, however, the economic globalism of the CFR planners scarcely diluted their commitment to American-British world leadership. Nor did it lead them to envision a full-scale international political organization, which, they recognized, represented a much more controversial proposition than economic institutions. In fact, they conceived of the World Bank specifically for the purpose of cementing Anglo-American cooperation and dominance. As Riefler characterized the group's objective, "We must establish interpenetration between the European economy and that of the rest of the world, and we want the United States and the United Kingdom to be running it."²⁹ For the CFR economists, the foremost rationale for promoting global development after the war was to address the balance-of-payments deficit

that Britain would face. The British Isles were hemorrhaging foreign reserves and invisible exports, a problem exacerbated by the State Department's demands to dismantle the imperial preference system in compensation for Lend-Lease aid. Once it engaged in postwar reconstruction, Britain seemed certain to struggle to finance heavy imports, particularly from the United States.

After bringing British economists into the CFR for a series of meetings, Hansen sailed to London to discuss the problem at a conference of government officials and experts from Chatham House and other bodies. He reported back that Keynes favored the continuation of bilateral exchange controls after the war; the United States would agree to buy British exports, and Britain would return the favor.³⁰ But Hansen and the other planners preferred a multilateral approach, which was also acceptable to Keynes. By building up the world economy, they thought, the Anglophone powers could create a market for British exports without having to negotiate and maintain clearing agreements, which might strain Anglo-American relations. For this reason the economists devised plans to guarantee private investment in underdeveloped regions through an international lending authority, controlled either wholly or two-thirds by American and British directors.³¹

Given the expansionist aims of the CFR's economic planners, one might be tempted to join some analysts in arguing that the perceived imperatives of capitalism propelled America's assumption of global political-military responsibilities and its recasting of international institutions.³² Yet politics cannot be reduced to economics so neatly, even when one looks no further than the CFR economists. The Economic and Financial Group embedded political considerations into its calculations at every turn. In the immediate aftermath of the German conquest of France, it deemed a quarter sphere area to be adequate for the U.S. economy alone, reversing itself only when interventionists and noninterventionists alike demanded the defense of the entire Western Hemisphere. Then it devised the Grand Area not merely to maintain liberal capitalism by absorbing export surpluses but also to outcompete Nazi Europe through greater self-sufficiency in trade and raw materials. In a cold war with the Nazis, geopolitics and economics would be intertwined. And neither factor would require an international political organization outside the monopoly of America and Britain.³³

MOREOVER, the economists did not clamor the loudest to expand the divided-world Grand Area to one-world globalism. It was instead the more

openly politically oriented CFR planners who pushed for fully global supremacy and, eventually, world organization. From March 1941 onward, the CFR's three other committees—the Armaments, Political, and Territorial Groups—attacked the strictures of the Grand Area despite continuing to treat it as the most realistic basis for planning. They put the economists on the defensive, forcing them to repeat that the Grand Area represented a mere minimum.³⁴ When Riefler deemed a German Europe to be incompatible with the American economy, he was accommodating the criticisms of *Foreign Affairs* editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong.³⁵ Armstrong and his colleagues in the Political Group worried that the Grand Area assumed the present war would give way to a destructive and uninspiring armed standoff with the Nazis, a peace in name only that would “go on until Germany either was defeated or ruled the world.”³⁶ They first articulated their objection at the end of 1940, recommending that the United States police the Western Hemisphere and let Britain take the east. In 1941 their objection remained but their prescription flipped: America should defeat the Nazis within Europe and lead everywhere. Francis P. Miller, the Anglophilic interventionist, put the issue bluntly as ever. He doubted that democracy could long survive within a limited area. “The goal of democracy,” he said, “must be world conquest, a world-wide victory for its ideal.” (Democracy was “not aggressive in spirit,” replied Harvard University Soviet expert Bruce C. Hopper, either in agreement or in disagreement.)³⁷ Even while the Axis powers controlled Europe, and before the Soviet Union entered the war, U.S. postwar planners chafed against their own plans for global supremacy, deeming them not global enough.

At the same time, planners remained staunchly American-British in their conception of the postwar political structure. That began to change after Operation Barbarossa introduced the most important international rather than domestic consideration to provoke a rethinking of formal American-British exclusivity: the entrance of the Soviet Union into the Grand Alliance and potentially the peace settlement. When Hitler ordered his Wehrmacht east, surprising American officials and analysts no less than Joseph Stalin, postwar planners in the CFR immediately, if vaguely, detected that they might need to adjust their Anglophone framework. The entire CFR staff met three days later on June 25 and recognized that wartime events could outstrip their plans. Until now, Armstrong remarked, the group had thought only in terms of “Anglo-American naval and air strategy.” Economist Percy Bidwell confessed that the Grand Area studies, based on prewar trade patterns, had been mistaken to ignore the Soviet Union altogether. More important than

international trade, it turned out, was industrial capacity.³⁸ (One planner had actually imagined in February that the postwar Soviet Union could pose an obstacle to American-British dominance, but he feared a "German-Russian bloc" that would fuse German technicians and Russian labor.)³⁹

After Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, however, the CFR men and government officials saw that an exclusively Anglo-American settlement might create enemies. In the State Department's postwar research division, a report in July warned of the emerging "United States Empire" in the Atlantic and the Pacific. "Any fundamental so-called lasting or enduring peace settlement must avoid planting, by a great expansion of our own world power, antagonisms which would render this country vulnerable in the future," the report stated.⁴⁰ Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles likely had this concern in mind when, on July 22, he gave a speech calling for the complete destruction of Nazi Germany and the creation of a new "association of nations."⁴¹ It was the closest a major administration official had come to endorsing world organization, although neither Welles's superior, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, nor colleagues like Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle shared Welles's sentiment.⁴²

By September the CFR planners gave full expression to the international rationale for broadening, in some fashion, the American-British concept. As League of Nations enthusiast Sweetser summed up, "alliance begets alliance." In a memorandum to the State Department, written on behalf of the CFR's Political Group, he warned that "Anglo-Americanism, if not carefully directed, may be made to appear as an attempt at world hegemony and Pan-Americanism as an exclusivist or divisive effort."⁴³ But this appearance might yet be averted. Combine the "Pax Anglo-Americana" with a new world organization, Sweetser proposed, and the latter could rescue the former. By involving other states in some sort of activities—Sweetser barely outlined what those might be—America and Britain could dominate without seeming domineering.

In other words, the Political Group valued world organization for its symbolic power. Common participation would evoke common control. The planners gave no more than an afterthought to which functions a new league would actually perform. While the Americans and British would "handle the *Realpolitik*," Sweetser suggested, the general organization might deal with economic, social, and technical matters. "The *substance* of such an organization is obviously a far more complex problem," he added, and left it at that.⁴⁴ What mattered was how the organization, whatever form it took, could cleanse American-British hegemony for the rest of the world.

International legitimation therefore constituted a significant rationale for widening the formal structure of the postwar order. It would remain so throughout the war. By itself international legitimation nonetheless falls short in accounting for policy elites' sudden interest in world organization during the last third of 1941. Although planners sought to remedy their neglect of the Soviet Union after the German invasion, they remained far from certain that the Soviets would survive the onslaught, much less win the war. If the Soviet Union lost, they recognized, the war would leave Eastern Europe in a shambles. In that case, postwar reconstruction would require even closer cooperation between the United States and Britain than the planners had anticipated.⁴⁵ In October the CFR planners questioned whether the Soviet Union would even be a party to the peace settlement. Regardless, all agreed that, as Miller wrote, "the negotiations that determine the outlines of the world to come will be between Americans and British."⁴⁶ American-British exclusivity continued to underpin the planning.

In any event, even if the Soviet Union had obsessed American planners, they could have sought to incorporate the Soviets alone into the postwar power structure, to form a concert of the Big Three. But in 1941 the CFR planners never contemplated turning the American-British concept into an American-British-Soviet one. Why, then, did they ponder including all other states besides America and Britain? Neither the territorial enlargement of U.S. postwar aims, nor the advent of the Soviet alliance, suffices to explain the surge of interest in world organization starting in the autumn of 1941. The answer lay closer to home.

The Problem of Public Opinion

Virtually from the moment they determined that the United States should possess supreme power in the world, foreign policy elites identified domestic political opinion to be a paramount challenge and an immediate priority. The exigencies of war did not prevent them from monitoring and strategizing about public opinion as they planned the American-British Grand Area; on the contrary, for all interventionists talked of a new interdependence in world affairs, it was the United States' insulation from the conflict, unique among the great powers, that afforded them the room to worry about their own public as frequently as they did the Wehrmacht. Self-consciously, then, U.S. policy elites sought to figure out how "power might commend itself to the American public in other ways than as an expression of traditional imperialism," as Miller put it.⁴⁷ What they offered in 1940 and 1941 were mainly two

exceptionalist nationalisms, American and Anglo-Saxon, deployed equally in the secretive CFR planning and in prominent essays by Walter Lippmann, Henry Luce, and others. Interventionist elites also lessened the appearance of "traditional imperialism" by touting the potential of mobile sea and air power to replace occupying land armies (or, in Luce's case, by barely referencing military force at all). Contrasting naval freedom with oppressive armies had been part of the repertoire of the British Empire since the eighteenth century; to judge from the passage of the Lend-Lease Act and the quickening march to war, such a formula might suit a *Pax Americana* as well. Not for nothing did Whitney Shepardson estimate, in July 1941, that U.S. public opinion would sooner accept an exclusive postwar partnership with the British Commonwealth than a universal league of nations.⁴⁸

But when Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill announced joint Anglo-American war aims, their Atlantic Charter failed to impress one of its primary audiences: Americans at home. In Congress, noninterventionists like Senator Hiram Johnson assailed the declaration for creating a *de facto* "offensive and defensive alliance between the United States and Britain."⁴⁹ Senator Robert A. Taft denounced the charter as asserting "complete power over the territorial disposition of the world," since it forbade territorial changes except where approved by the peoples concerned and required only the Axis powers to disarm.⁵⁰ Senator Arthur Capper, while expressing abhorrence of Hitler, believed America's bid for postwar domination would subvert its freedom and independence. "I am opposed to our attempting to police all Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Seven Seas," he told radio listeners, "and to our paying the costs of all their wars."⁵¹ In terms once called internationalist, these critics objected to U.S. embroilment in power politics across the globe.

It was not only committed noninterventionists who bridled at the Atlantic Charter. In the postwar planning commission of the Federal Council of Churches, the members were split over whether America should enter the war, but they knew what they thought about the charter. John Foster Dulles, the chairman of the Protestant ecumenical group and the future cold warrior, judged that the charter envisaged "Anglo-Saxon military and economic hegemony" that would freeze the status quo. In this regard, the charter fell "far short" of Wilson's formula. It smacked of a victors' peace whereas Dulles and his commission wished America and Britain would create "international organs having the power to make decisions in which others will participate as a matter of right."⁵² In a private letter, Dulles was indignant at the hypocrisy of Roosevelt for promising, in the charter, to "seek no aggrandizement,

territorial or other." Dulles foresaw that ample aggrandizement "will be a fact," and he listed the ways in which it already was: "We have acquired for ninety-nine years far-flung naval bases in the Atlantic. We have taken over Greenland and Iceland, and through the guise of developing commercial aviation we have driven the German and Italian airlines pretty much out of South America and are developing there what in reality are United States military air bases. We are greatly developing naval and air bases in the far distant Pacific islands and in the northwestern extremes of Alaska. These, coupled with our two ocean navy, will put us in a position to dominate the Far East." These developments, undertaken after the fall of France and before Pearl Harbor, left Dulles with no doubt that "the United States will come out of this period with a combination of naval power, air power and strategic bases controlling both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and South America to an extent that we will have acquired a dominant position in the world comparable to that of England during the last century. It seems to me that this is in fact 'aggrandizement, territorial or otherwise.'"⁵³ If the values of prewar internationalism were dying, they were not quite dead. At the birth of U.S. world leadership, prominent Americans found the prospect imperialistic.

American-British advocates were unable to deny the poor reception of their idea. Lippmann admitted as much in his column, although he continued to tout the unity of the "English-speaking peoples" through the rest of 1941.⁵⁴ In the CFR the postwar planners changed course. Noting that the charter "fell like a dead duck" upon Congress and the public, they doubted that exclusively American or American-British arrangements could ever be made acceptable.⁵⁵ Sweetser led the Political Group in penning a stinging rebuke to the Atlantic Charter, less for its content than for its optics. As the group wrote to the State Department: "An *imperialistic* connotation may all too easily be given to the projected American-British policing of the seas, not only by Axis propaganda-mongers, but by perfectly sincere people as well."⁵⁶

As the Political Group saw it, Roosevelt and Churchill relied too narrowly and overtly on the presumed superiority of their nations. Such exceptionalism needed internationalism too—a sense of law, equality, and peace offered by Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points but missing from Roosevelt's Eight Points. Whereas Wilson had promised universal disarmament, at least eventually, Roosevelt envisaged the victors remaining "heavily armed themselves—for an indefinite period," Sweetser noted. Although Wilson had wished to reincorporate the defeated powers into the world community, Roosevelt appeared to condemn them to permanent subjugation. Worst of

all, Roosevelt said nothing about international political organization, which Wilson had put at the center of a program to overcome power politics. In short, Roosevelt had just committed the United States to a military alliance too naked to command popular support. Sweetser delivered a harsh verdict to the State Department: "It would be harder to sell the 'Atlantic Charter' to the American people than it was Wilson's program."⁵⁷

Having heaped scorn on the concept of world organization for the past two years, American policy elites now began to discuss whether to create one. On August 26, less than two weeks after the enunciation of the Atlantic Charter, the CFR planners held extensive discussions on international organization for the first time since the fall of France.⁵⁸ Soon officers in other postwar groups also noticed a change. As the Federal Council of Churches' liaison in Britain reported in September, "Nearly all the best people in America are thinking in terms of the all-in association of nations of the League of Nations kind."⁵⁹ In October leaders of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, an educational group dedicated to perpetuating Wilson's ideals, likewise noted "very definite indications of the return to public interest and favor of both Mr. Wilson and the program for which he stood."⁶⁰ Through the rest of the year, the CFR's Political Group entertained proposals for international organization alongside its exclusively American-British schemes. In the Armaments Group, planners went so far as to contemplate an international police force, possibly including "token" German units, that would impose disarmament on central and western Europe.⁶¹ The Economic and Financial Group, for its part, figured it ought to allow one-third of the directors of its postwar development and finance organization to come from states other than America and Britain.⁶²

This was a subtle but significant shift, triggered by domestic considerations more directly than external ones. Postwar planners feared that under the formula of the Atlantic Charter, the American public would recoil from world leadership, perhaps from international involvement altogether, once the war concluded. What necessitated world organization was the "critical importance of beginning here and now to re-educate the American people up to their international responsibilities," historian Henry Wriston commented to the rest of the Political Group. The best antidote, Wriston continued, was to involve the United States in international institutions and joint obligations in relatively uncontroversial areas, eroding public resistance through symbolic acts of cooperation.⁶³ Now, only weeks after they got the official American-British declaration they wanted, postwar

planners and thinkers determined that stark global supremacy might be an impossible sell. Instead of working toward a better pitch of the Atlantic Charter, they determined that no words could prettify the "imperialistic connotation" of American-British exclusivity. For so tall an order, the United States would have to create a new world organization, however undesirable in its own right.

In reaching this decision, postwar planners cited "public opinion" as their main reason. What they meant by this term requires explanation. Most literally, the planners were referring to momentary mass preferences, as represented in opinion polls and public expressions. Some evidence from such sources did suggest that American-British supremacy faced a legitimization problem that was unlikely to go away. Influential commentators had criticized American global supremacy ever since interventionists like Lippmann, Luce, and journalist Dorothy Thompson floated the prospect early in 1941. These critics, like the senators who were dismayed by the Atlantic Charter, consistently identified armed supremacy with imperialism broadly defined. Months before the charter was released, Freda Kirchwey, the editor of *The Nation*, condemned the American Century as a "new brand of imperialism" cloaked in sweet words.⁶⁴ Norman Thomas, a leader of the Socialist Party and the Keep America Out of War Congress, denounced a fast growing "imperialist feeling in the United States of America . . . altogether lacking until the last four months."⁶⁵ Not to be outdone, the *Christian Century*, the periodical of mainline Protestantism, shuddered that schemes like Lippmann's would involve the United States in "the greatest imperialistic venture in history."⁶⁶

The critics likened U.S. global supremacy both to nineteenth-century European empire and to the contemporaneous New Order of the Nazis—evils united in Thomas's reference to "that British Nazi poet, Rudyard Kipling."⁶⁷ But they required few other semantic innovations in order to make their case. They simply appealed to the long-standing internationalist values of equality, democracy, and disarmament among nations. As Kirchwey contended, U.S. global preeminence would contravene "honest internationalism," despite Luce and company's effort to appropriate the term and cast their opponents as isolationists. "The fact is," she wrote, "no democratic basis for national dominance can be found in any formula, no matter how you slice it. It cannot be found because it does not exist."⁶⁸ Kirchwey ruled out U.S. global supremacy root and branch, writing with the confidence of someone who expected her assumptions to make intuitive sense to her readers.

Yet most elites did not draw the same implication from the hierarchical nature of American supremacy. Kirchwey lacked the social position of Luce; Thomas was no Roosevelt; and Taft and the noninterventionists were losing ground in Congress. More typical of the criticism than Kirchwey's outright rejection was the accommodative stance of Max Lerner. A columnist and political scientist, Lerner detected the peril that Kirchwey did, stating that Luce's vision of an American Century would anoint "American imperialism," antithetical to democracy, around the globe. But he wanted to think that world leadership and participatory democracy could be reconciled. By entering into some sort of "partnership" with countries in Europe, the Far East, and Latin America, he wrote, the United States could fulfill "our great role of leadership" after all.⁶⁹ It was this logic that Roosevelt's planners adopted in the wake of the Atlantic Charter: a symbolic internationalism could cleanse imperialism, squaring it with the democratic impulses that were the well-spring of public legitimacy.

Taken as a whole, then, opinion surveys and political commentary indicated no great rejection of U.S. supremacy or American-British leadership. Postwar planners feared "public opinion" out of proportion to actual opinions expressed by the public. In their many discussions of the problem, they rarely cited an existing political force that menaced their plans. And when they did mention opinion polls, they found them more encouraging than not. As several CFR planners remarked in September, recent Gallup polls indicated that majorities of the public eschewed postwar disarmament and now regretted America's abstention from the League of Nations.⁷⁰ Although the Atlantic Charter did not fire the public imagination, neither did most Americans dismiss it as an instrument of American-British imperialism. In late August, as postwar planners lambasted the charter, a poll showed that 42 percent of Americans approved of Roosevelt and Churchill's program whereas 17 percent disapproved.⁷¹ The outstanding reaction, perhaps, was none at all: 41 percent had no opinion. In another poll five months later, upwards of 80 percent could not name one provision of the charter.⁷² Indifference might have disappointed the planners, but it does not explain their about-face.

When planners expressed anxiety about *public opinion* they did not, in the main, mean the term literally. *Public opinion* sometimes denoted mass preferences and utterances but also signified ethico-political legitimacy in the national political sphere. Under this second meaning, U.S. elites understood the public to be fundamentally opposed to power politics—the defining

quality of prewar internationalism, now associated with isolationism. Whatever the polls said for the moment, the public seemed liable to recoil from international responsibilities once the fighting stopped.⁷³ Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle had this conception in mind when he worried in his diary that "the American public, with its natural aversion to war and its natural inclination to optimism," might welcome Hitler's promises of peace.⁷⁴ The America First Committee also appealed to the peaceful proclivities of ordinary Americans but, contrary to Berle, warned against the U.S. government concluding an undemocratic and imperialist peace. Sounding like prototypical nineteenth-century internationalists, the committee declared: "The long range aims and policies of our country must be determined by the people through Congress. We hope that secret treaties committing America to imperialistic aims or vast burdens in other parts of the world shall be scrupulously avoided to the end that this nation shall become a champion of a just and lasting peace."⁷⁵ From the standpoint of traditional internationalism, interventionists faced an uphill battle in making U.S. participation in global politics acceptable.

But a fix was available. Instead of separating from political entanglement, the United States could redeem the world through intervention aimed at transcending power politics. Wilson had proposed just this alternative through his "disentangling alliance" of the League of Nations. Yet his United States, in 1919, seemed too weak both to remake the world and to stay politically and military above the fray. Two decades later, the United States finally possessed the material power to make Wilson's vision more credible—except that Wilson's heirs no longer wished to do so. In the wake of the Atlantic Charter, postwar planners pioneered a third way: gesture rather faintly at ending power politics while implementing power politics on a global scale. A simulacrum of Wilsonianism could flatter the public's sensibilities, making supremacy safe for democracy.

And the flattery would extend beyond the public's sensibilities. The language of "public opinion" served a third and final function, in addition to denoting expressed preferences and connoting general norms. It allowed interventionists to express indirectly their own anxiety that their vision might be as imperialistic as their critics charged. Perhaps those "perfectly sincere people" whom the CFR planners fingered included themselves. Projecting their qualms onto the public, interventionists could voice, and contain, their cognitive dissonance. For in envisioning U.S. political-military preeminence, they were violating their own values as internationalists long com-

mitted to the transcendence of power politics. To a blistering detractor who thought great-power dominance was the way to "imperialism," not "permanent peace," Shotwell replied only that he had a "strong conviction that liberty loving people will not make themselves over into international police forces for any length of time."⁷⁶

Occasionally interventionists registered the contradiction, sounding indistinguishable from noninterventionists. Several CSOP members, for example, protested Shotwell's plans as constituting a "rather indefinite dictatorship by Britain and America."⁷⁷ When several dozen Anglophone academics and officials convened at Prouts Neck, Maine, for the Conference on North Atlantic Relations—seeking to implement the Atlantic Charter, promulgated three weeks earlier—one objected that his colleagues envisioned an "Anglo-American Holy Alliance." He complained that the group was assuming the benevolence of American and British power, but nations on the other end might react as Americans and Britons had received Klemens von Metternich and his monarchs.⁷⁸ If internationalism seemed to be morphing into its opposite, however, that was not how advocates of global supremacy wanted to see it. After the Atlantic Charter held up a mirror, they needed a new way to justify supremacy to themselves.

IN THE FOUR MONTHS BETWEEN THE announcement of the Atlantic Charter and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the idea of world organization rose from the dead, but not via a linear resurrection. American policy elites did not revalue the League of Nations, originally conceived and still perceived as a vehicle for expressing public opinion and controlling military power. To the contrary, a new world organization gained appeal as a device for *managing* public opinion and *projecting* military power. Planners hoped to synthesize the substance of American global supremacy, in partnership with Britain, with the form of league-style universalism.

How, exactly? Once brought down to specifics, how would world organization convey a sense of common participation without involving common control? How would it seem more serious than the League about meting out armed sanctions and yet be less binding upon the great-power enforcers? Such questions only began to be posed in 1941 as the paradigms of American-British policing and world organization jostled against one another. Two days after Pearl Harbor, Shepardson acknowledged that his Political Group should

"make up its mind whether the object of this collaboration was to perpetuate an American-British hegemony or to provide a nucleus of a general system of collective security."⁷⁹ Shotwell conveyed the same ambivalence in addressing the public as chairman of CSOP. "The postwar world," he cautioned, "will not be ready for anything so splendid as the immediate establishment of a stronger and more universal League of Nations." Perhaps such a new league would follow, after the United States and Great Britain exercised "chief responsibility" for setting the terms of peace.⁸⁰

However abstractly, U.S. policy elites forged a powerful argument before the nation entered the war: the United States had to lead the postwar world, and world organization might make it happen. As Sweetser wrote, "it would be one kind of world with America active, another with America inactive."⁸¹ When Japanese planes bombed a U.S. naval base in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, turning the United States into a formal belligerent, the attack on Pearl Harbor caused nowhere near as deep a shock as the fall of France. America's place in the world had been reconceptualized over the previous eighteen months. Even the war of position in American politics had largely been won. As the interventionist senator (and future ambassador to the U.N.) Warren Austin noted a month before Pearl Harbor, Americans had resolved to "transform a country which had become almost entirely isolationist and pacifist into the most powerful military country on earth."⁸² Austin was correct that a true transformation had taken place. And when he cast the prewar United States as "entirely isolationist and pacifist," he exhibited the deeper achievement of advocates of global supremacy: casting domination of an entire hemisphere as total disengagement, thus turning armed preeminence into the only option. What Pearl Harbor did was to make manifest that the contest was over. The America First Committee dissolved just days later, declaring its principles to have been right but its cause to have been lost.⁸³ Non-interventionists got behind the war effort.

Far from reexamining their assumptions after Pearl Harbor, postwar planners affirmed them. On December 15, geographer Isaiah Bowman, who chaired the CFR Territorial Group, wrote to Armstrong and exulted that the United States "must accept world responsibility." In the past, he admitted, the nation had been "rather timorous in our approach to this question," and in his view justly so: "We are not imperialistic in outlook. We have no desire to dominate the world." To seek domination was wrong, Bowman implied—as he argued that the United States must seek domination. "The

measure of our victory," he concluded, "will be the measure of our domination after victory."⁸⁴

"The Kind of a World We Want"


Two weeks after the United States entered the war, President Roosevelt approved the establishment of a fully governmental planning committee to pick up where the CFR had left off.⁸⁵ The State Department's Advisory Committee on American Foreign Policy first convened on February 12, 1942, in Welles's office.⁸⁶ As Roosevelt's man in the department, Welles led the committee into 1943, guiding discussions and pronouncing when a consensus on a subject had been reached. He also went over the head of Secretary of State Cordell Hull to keep Roosevelt apprised of the committee's work. More than anyone, it was Welles who convinced the skeptical president to get behind a world organization by March 1943 and persuade Great Britain and the Soviet Union to follow suit.⁸⁷

In public Welles positioned himself as the second coming of Woodrow Wilson. Standing at Wilson's tomb in November 1941, he became the first member of Roosevelt's inner circle to endorse U.S. participation in a postwar world organization. Americans, he said, "must turn again for light and for inspiration to the ideals of that great seer," Woodrow Wilson. "How rarely in human history has the vision of a statesman been so tragically and so swiftly vindicated."⁸⁸ High praise, yet faint; a prophet sees but does not do. From the start of the planning, Welles held up the League of Nations as an antimodel. What was needed, he said, was a "completely fresh approach."⁸⁹ Welles expected that a decade after the war's end "we would not have arrived in any Utopia"; rather, "the same old jealousies and fears and hatreds and tensions would be reasserting themselves."⁹⁰ Led by Welles, State Department planners set out to determine how the United States could project its full power in a world prone to war.

That they inherited the assumptions of the CFR's planning was no coincidence: the State Department brought in the CFR planners themselves. Before Pearl Harbor, officials looked forward to drawing upon "the best brains outside the government" when they took planning in-house.⁹¹ Thus when the new, official planning group was assembled, it was not quite new nor fully official. CFR planners chaired two of the four original subcommittees: Norman H. Davis, the CFR president, headed the Subcommittee on Security

Problems, and Isaiah Bowman took over the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, too, proved an influential member and coordinated with the CFR planning staff, which continued to operate throughout the war. The State Department brought in several other outsiders as well: Anne O'Hare McCormick, a *New York Times* columnist; Myron Taylor, a former executive of US Steel; and later Clark Eichelberger and James Shotwell, two leading organizers of anti-isolationist intellectual elites.⁹²

Early in 1942, with the United States finally in the war and assured of its standing in the peace, the diplomats and experts recruited by the State Department treated America's supremacy as an established fact. Extending the ambition of the CFR group, State Department planners foresaw the whole postwar world unified under U.S. leadership. Gone were the elaborate geographical calculations performed in the year after the fall of France to determine how much of a divided world the United States should seek to lead. Now globalism was axiomatic, requiring no justification. American interests and responsibilities "embrace the whole world," Bowman confirmed.⁹³



This map, published by the U.S. Navy in 1944, displays the global extent of America's naval operations at the height of the war. Courtesy of David Rumsey Historical Map Collection.

Unhappy news came in from the battlefield in the first half of 1942. Behind Field Marshall Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps, the Nazis took the offensive in North Africa. Japan tore through the Dutch East Indies and captured the British stronghold of Singapore. In Washington, DC, however, the planners imagined a prostrate postwar world looking to America for leadership. "The peoples now sunk under the pressure of the enemy forces would really need leadership with respect to everything," Bowman commented in March. "It had been so in 1918 and 1919. Their minds no longer were self-reliant and independent, and they looked desperately for someone to give orders." By wrecking the old order, Hitler appeared to have wiped clean the slate of history, only it was the United States, not Germany, that would define the future. In discussing the problem of minorities in Europe, for instance, Welles remarked that although people tended to look down on the transfer of populations as a harsh practice, "the next generation would not feel that way, and we must look a long way ahead." Bowman concurred. "People were getting used to the idea of moving minorities," he said, "because Hitler had carried the process so far."⁹⁴

If "the kind of a world we want," in one planner's phrase, seemed within reach, one obstacle stood out above the rest.⁹⁵ It was not the Soviet Union or international communism. Although some worried about Russian domination of eastern Europe, and thence Germany and western Europe, such fears stayed in the background of their discussions through 1942, while the Soviet Union still battled for survival. By contrast, the problem of American "public opinion" preoccupied the State Department planners as much as it had their predecessors in the CFR. Few meetings elapsed without someone interjecting that everything they were working toward depended on the public overcoming its traditional aversion to extrahemispheric political and military action. "Our very biggest problem may be at home," Bowman said, to Welles's affirmation on behalf of the group. "How should we go about keeping our present sense of responsibility, so prevalent today throughout the American public—keep it into and throughout that postwar period?"⁹⁶

Opinion polls were heartening to a degree. "Every poll of opinion," Welles noted, showed the public willing to enforce peace and join an "international organization with teeth."⁹⁷ But no amount of data could quell the planners' anxiety, convinced as they were that "isolationism" might always surface. Shotwell, now part of the State Department group, wrote the very first draft for world organization that the planners considered. He did not mention the Soviet Union. Instead he began by exclaiming that "the present

war has caused a major revolution in American thinking with reference to the problem of national security"—and yet claimed sentences later that "the innate longing of Americans for their old-time isolation is probably as strong as ever."⁹⁸ Understanding global supremacy to have dubious American credentials, postwar planners sought to reconcile their project with the values of the U.S. public and political system.

This was the planners' most salient concern as they decided to create a new world organization. On March 7, 1942, the Subcommittee on Political Problems, composed of the principals of the larger committee, ended its inaugural meeting with Welles stating that the planners "should definitely assume that an international political organization would be established." The planners had barely addressed what such an organization would look like. For most of the meeting, they mostly discussed when to hold a peace conference, and despite feeling that the last conference in Paris had tried to solve too many problems at once, they concluded that the United States should orchestrate a peace conference during rather than after the war, lest "our national *will* to handle the peace problems, with all their difficulties, might be dissipated."⁹⁹

At the next meeting, on March 21, they reiterated the point. Only one aspect of international organization merited discussion: the need to set it up quickly so as to lock internationalism into the public mind and keep isolationism down. If world organization were delayed, "American opinion might not be in support of our program to the extent necessary 'to put it across,'" warned the lawyer Benjamin Cohen, from Roosevelt's brain trust. Intensive work now "would give time for ideas to crystalize favorably prior to the armistice." Welles agreed. "Postponement of international organization," he said, "might give American opinion time to veer away from necessary international participation."¹⁰⁰ The matter was decided, Welles affirmed: the United States should establish a world organization and do so before the war was through.

Having accepted the bare idea of world organization, the planners turned next week to its structure, which they thought might be erected during the war. The outline of what became the U.N. Security Council can be traced to this March 28 meeting. Here the planners figured out how to reconcile great-power privilege with the universal form of world organization. Three objectives guided them: establishing an effective policing apparatus directed by the great powers, making the small powers feel included, and ensuring American freedom of action and the ultimate approval of the U.S. Senate.

The solution, they decided, should begin by vesting real power to make decisions solely in the U.S.-led Big Four, including Britain and the Soviet Union and perhaps France or China. As a small body possessing the force of arms, it could take decisive action as the League of Nations Council could not. Yet this could and should be accomplished without kicking out the small powers. The aim should be that of "instilling the fullest possible sense of participation," said the CFR's Armstrong. A sense of participation could be *instilled* because it was essentially to be a simulacrum of participation. The planners mused that four or five small powers, each representing a region on a rotating basis, could sit on the new council as long as they were stripped of the veto power that all representatives had enjoyed under the League's unanimity rule. Perhaps the Big Four would also "hand pick" the delegates sent by these nations in order to assure their suitability. When Berle objected that the plan sounded like the "sterile intellectual mold of the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations," Bowman assured him of the contrary. The Big Four would retain control in a "quiet intangible organization" behind the scenes. All the planners desired was some method whereby "all states could be given recognition and given opportunity to regard themselves as participants in the decisions made." "Speaking frankly," Welles summed up, "what we required was a sop-for the smaller states: some organization in which they could be represented and made to feel themselves participants."¹⁰¹

In mid-July Welles formed a new Subcommittee on International Organization, chaired by himself, in order to formulate a draft constitution to present to Roosevelt. After some hesitation, the planners decided to retain a successor to the League of Nations Assembly so that defeated powers and small states could "meet and ventilate their grievances."¹⁰² Shotwell had spent much of the interwar period promoting criteria for defining aggression in order to make collective security obligations more binding, but now he led the way in rejecting any such thing. The planners jettisoned the requirements of the League of Nations Covenant, contained in Articles 10 and 16, that obligated member states to apply sanctions. This time, the great powers would enjoy full discretion to identify aggressors and decide whether and how to act.¹⁰³ Rather than attempt to strengthen international law and the judicial settlement of disputes, the planners sought to subordinate them to great-power politics. Certainly, the planners agreed, an international court was no place to decide matters of war and peace. Shotwell decried "the American tendency (in contrast to the British) to lump together all kinds of international

disputes within a juristic framework. The identification of acts of aggression was a political matter which could only be handled by a politically constituted agency." At one point he suggested discarding the Permanent Court of International Justice in order to revert to the informal methods of arbitration ascendant before World War I.¹⁰⁴ Shotwell stood ready to undo the attempts of internationalists, over more than two decades, to judicialize international politics by setting up a court and promoting or requiring its use to resolve differences.

Shotwell's reference to an outmoded "American tendency" underscored how far ideas of internationalism had traveled over the past decade and especially within the past two years. U.S. elites now looked upon international society from a position of paramountcy, and they grew as jealous of political discretion as the British had been in the last war. Ironically, this evolution brought about a more suspicious attitude toward the British government itself. The heroic Britain of 1941, standing between Hitler and America, never completely disappeared, but the planners increasingly viewed Britain as a postwar competitor standing between American capital and the colonies. Welles, for example, wanted to disabuse the British of any assumption that the United States was fighting to save their empire. Even a remodeled British Empire, he said, would be a "valuable asset" only if it operated on a broad basis of international partnership.¹⁰⁵

As U.S. diplomats tried to convince Britain to end imperial preferences in return for Lend-Lease aid, State Department planners studied the colonial world in the autumn of 1942 and found American power and world organization to be congruent there as well. Rather than seek to decolonize subject peoples, a course that would free each new state to close its borders to liberal capitalist exchange, the planners opted to internationalize colonialism. In the heady period between the autumn of 1942 and the spring of 1943, before great-power negotiations began in earnest, Welles and his planners hoped to extend to all colonies a strengthened mandates system with U.S. representation on regional councils.¹⁰⁶ They even entertained proposals to bring the current mandates under "direct international administration" where U.S. officials could serve.¹⁰⁷ Once again Americanization and internationalization went hand in hand: the new trustees administering French North Africa, Roosevelt told Welles, might well be American.¹⁰⁸ The plans would prove difficult to implement, but the torch of world leadership had clearly passed from London to Washington, DC. By the beginning of 1944, Roosevelt delighted in finding himself "unquestionably better prepared than the British"

regarding proposals for the postwar world—a reversal, he pointed out, of Wilson's fate.¹⁰⁹

As Roosevelt's planners contemplated what kind of world they wanted, they emphasized the global projection of American power and worried chiefly that the American people would stand in the way. World organization emerged as a means to this end, as a device for suppressing what they perceived as the public's default disinclination to sustain global supremacy. Yet the planners' instrumental attitudes toward world organization should not obscure the genuine, hierarchical ideal that the organization symbolized for them. In the coming epoch of American leadership, the United States would exercise control but every nation would speak. The small powers would "ventilate" in the American forum, the U.N., bestowing recognition upon the order America gave them even as they blew off steam.

One of the planners put the matter concisely at the end of an early, winding meeting (described by Welles as "'jumping around' too widely") full of uncertainty about how to redraw the map of Europe. "The endurance of our terms of settlement would be the great test," said Anne O'Hare McCormick, the *New York Times* columnist. America needed to see "popular acquiescence in those settlements." Welles approved. "If the people agree to their destiny as we see it," McCormick continued, "we can expect the peace to last."¹¹⁰ Whatever course the United States chose—no matter how arbitrary the choice—would be the only way, and all others should be expected to follow. That others might act differently, and fail "the great test," the planners did not discuss.

From Four Policemen to the United Nations via American Power

Postwar planners thought they could determine the fate of the peoples of the world, but for some time they struggled to convince their boss to entertain their big idea, a new world organization, at all. In the year following the declaration of the Atlantic Charter, Roosevelt inserted China and the Soviet Union into his vision of American-British world orderers, but he refused to go further. In April 1942, Welles sent him a sketch of a "United Nations Authority." Adding five regional representatives to Roosevelt's Four Policemen, the authority would eventually expand into a full world organization. But Welles found his proposal "summarily turned down at the highest level."¹¹¹ According to everyone who discussed postwar matters with Roosevelt in 1942, the president felt firmly that the Big Four should dictate the peace.¹¹² The United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and perhaps China—they

would police the world and "all other nations save the Big Four should be disarmed," Roosevelt told the Soviet foreign minister.¹¹³ Roosevelt was not about to relinquish control of war and peace to another League of Nations with a hundred signatories to satisfy.

Then Welles showed him that he did not have to. In a two-hour meeting in January 1943, Welles laid out how the postwar planners had squared great-power control with universal participation.¹¹⁴ Embedded in a world organization, the United States could exert *more* control than in an informal four-power concert. Welles's draft, like the eventual U.N. Charter, required every member nation to make its forces and facilities available to the great powers. By internationalizing colonies and strategic bases, the organization opened the world to American access.¹¹⁵ Welles's detailed exposition might have converted Roosevelt; by 1943, too, Roosevelt was more willing to make territorial settlements and more suspicious of Soviet intentions, deciding to revive France as a counterweight rather than disarm it completely.¹¹⁶ Roosevelt clearly did not metamorphose into an advocate of subordinating American power to international law and multilateral procedures. In March he proposed a new world organization to the British for the first time and spoke in Wellesian terms. The Big Four would make "all the more important decisions," the president said. Once a year or so, the universal assembly would meet, but not to take action. Small countries, the president said, would merely "blow off steam."¹¹⁷

From 1943 to 1945 Roosevelt convinced his allies to sign up to a new world organization, which neither Churchill nor Stalin, thinking along regionalist lines, had favored.¹¹⁸ Without the initiative of the United States, nothing like the U.N. would have come into being. But the subsequent negotiations over the veto power, and related provisions on which historians have focused, shed dim light on why the United States made a top diplomatic priority of establishing the organization, an objective that ranked as high as any other in the horse-trading at Yalta and other summits.¹¹⁹ As the historian Warren Kimball points out, Roosevelt himself regarded subsequent disputes over the veto as a triviality, relevant mainly for domestic political reasons.¹²⁰ More illuminating is the moment of conception, revealing in particular that the American decision to create the U.N. is explicable only as part, and a subordinate part, of the American decision to seek global political-military supremacy.

As they first envisaged a new world organization, officials and intellectuals assumed other powers would go along with American prerogatives in the future. They never debated the merits of multilateralism versus unilateralism, having designed an organization that would minimize the burdens of the

former. In a few instances, however, they indicated a preference if events should force a choice. "The United States must exercise power after this war," Buell reflected in March 1942, as the officials he advised made the decision to set up a new world organization. "It must not allow its initiative to be vetoed by other countries but it must be willing to allow other United Nations to associate themselves with us in the exercise of this power."¹²¹

Buell was not alone in prizing America's freedom of action. On the Board of Economic Warfare, the vice president's New Deal lieutenant, Milo Perkins, laid out a ten-page wish list of gifts that the United States could bestow upon the postwar world. "We have power," Perkins wrote. Foreseeing that some nations would not go along with this power, he insisted the United States must exercise leadership nonetheless. Perkins concluded, "If we attempt active participation in postwar world affairs before ridding ourselves of the fear that an indecisive position might displease certain nations because it sets forth frankly what we want, we shall end by pleasing nobody and by bringing ruin to ourselves. This nation from its beginning has stood for certain basic ideals; we must work boldly for their world wide fulfillment and let the chips fall where they may."¹²² Multilateralism where possible, unilateralism if necessary: with this formula Perkins asserted American sovereignty over international society.

THE DEBATE THAT WASN'T, 1942–1945

ARNOLD TOYNBEE HAD NOT VISITED the United States in a decade when Rockefeller Foundation money brought him back in the autumn of 1942. But Toynbee, officially the director of studies at Chatham House, and unofficially the dean of British internationalists, knew exactly whom to see.¹ He spent two weeks meeting with postwar planners in the State Department and another week in New York with the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Then he circulated around the country, renewing acquaintances with Raymond Leslie Buell, Edward Mead Earle, and Quincy Wright, among other postwar-minded semiofficial elites. He failed in his attempt to establish formal exchanges of personnel between planners in America and Britain; Leo Pasvolsky, chief of research in the State Department, brushed the request aside, determined to keep control in American hands.² Yet when Toynbee reported back to the Foreign Office, he had nothing but good news to deliver.

Finally British diplomacy was seeing the realization of one of its foremost objectives since 1914: rousing the United States fully into world politics. Toynbee found his American counterparts preparing a massive campaign of public education in the evils of "isolationism" and the corresponding virtues of projecting U.S. power in the postwar world. Toynbee himself doubted the need for such a campaign. Most everyone he met seemed as committed to world leadership as they were anxious that the rest of the country would recoil.

149. Raymond Leslie Buell, "Relations with Britain," supplement to *Fortune*, May 1942, 5.
150. Buell to Time Inc. Post-War Committee, "Americo-British Power."
151. Buell, "Relations with Britain," 7.
152. Fill Calhoun, "How Isolationist Is the Midwest?" *Life*, December 1, 1941, 20.
153. Charles K. Webster, diary, April 10, 1941, Section 29/9, CW. For details on Webster's trip to America and planning in Britain, see P. A. Reynolds and E. J. Hughes, *The Historian as Diplomat: Charles Kingsley Webster and the United Nations, 1939–1946* (London: Martin Robertson, 1976), ch. 2.
154. Charles K. Webster, diary, April 9 and 14, 1941, Section 29/9, CW.
155. See Leo Pasvolksky to Sumner Welles, April 11, 1941, Box 54, HN; Leo Pasvolksky to Cordell Hull, "Proposal for the Organization of Work for the Formulation of Post-war Foreign Policies," September 12, 1941, Box 54, HN; and Cordell Hull to Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 22, 1941, Box 54, HN.
156. Hamilton Fish Armstrong to Norman H. Davis, August 18, 1941, Box 78, HFA; Leo Pasvolksky to Cordell Hull, "Proposal." The CFR planners in Donovan's group included historian William Langer and political scientist Walter Sharp. On Donovan's bid to plan the peace, see John Hedley, "The Evolution of Intelligence Analysis in the U.S. Intelligence Community," in *Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives*, 2nd ed., ed. James Bruce and Roger George (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 23–24; Barry M. Katz, *Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1942–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 2–18; and Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Frederick, MD: Aletheia Books, 1981), chs. 4–5.
157. Donald G. Stevens, "Organizing for Economic Defense: Henry Wallace and the Board of Economic Warfare's Policy Initiatives, 1942," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 26, no. 4 (Fall 1996): 1126–39.
158. Henry Wallace to Hamilton Fish Armstrong, April 9, 1941, Box 64, HFA.
159. Wallace, "Our Second Chance," 363–64; and Henry Wallace, "The Century of the Common Man," May 8, 1942, in *Prefaces to Peace*, 369–75.
160. The strong points ranged from the Western Hemisphere (Newfoundland; Guantanamo, Cuba, to Puerto Rico; Panama; Natal to Pernambuco, Brazil); to Europe (the British Isles; Gibraltar); Africa (Dakar to Freetown; Cape Town); the Middle East (Suez; Aden); and the Asia Pacific (Port Darwin, Singapore, Hawaii, Dutch Harbor).
161. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Notes on the Conversation of May 3d [1941]," Box 64, HFA.
162. Economic and Financial Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. E-A16, May 17, 1941, CFRWPS.
163. Adolf Berle, diary, July 19, 1941, Box 213, AB.
164. See, for example, Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the U.N.* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 40; Paul Kennedy, *The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations* (New York: Random House, 2006), 25; and Plesch, *America, Hitler and the UN*, 24–27.

165. U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, August 11, 1941, 11:00 a.m. meeting, Box 151, SW.
166. U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, "British-American Cooperation," August 11, 1941, afternoon meeting, Box 151, SW.
167. See Mark Reeves, "The Broad, Toiling Masses in All the Continents: Anticolonial Activists and the Atlantic Charter" (MA thesis, Western Kentucky University, 2014); Penny Von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 25–28; and Fredrik Logevall, *Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 2012), 48–50.
168. Elizabeth Borgwardt makes a strong claim for an anticolonial Atlantic Charter, teleologically writing that the charter offered "aspirational outlines of objectives, classically 'thin' sets of general principles," which in turn included "self-determination." Elizabeth Borgwardt, "When You State a Moral Principle, You Are Stuck With It: The 1941 Atlantic Charter as a Human Rights Instrument," *Virginia Journal of International Law* 46, no. 3 (Spring 2006): 503, 505.
169. Frank Knox, "World Peace Must Be Enforced: We Should Prevent the Rise of New Hitlers," address to the American Bar Association, Indianapolis, October 1, 1941, in *Vital Speeches of the Day* 8, no. 1 (November 15, 1941): 18.

4. INSTRUMENTAL INTERNATIONALISM, 1941–1943

1. Arguing that realism in the practice and academic field of international relations came "out of Europe" or is "un-American," in Martti Koskenniemi's and Anders Stephanson's respective words, are Daniel Bessner, *Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the Defense Intellectual* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018); Udi Greenberg, *The Weimar Century: German Émigrés and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); Nicolas Guillot, *After the Enlightenment: Political Realism and International Relations in the Mid-twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870–1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 413–94; Felix Rösch, ed., *Émigré Scholars and the Genesis of International Relations: A European Discipline in America?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); and Anders Stephanson, "Kennan: Realism as Desire," in *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory*, ed. Nicolas Guillot (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 162–81.
2. Edward Mead Earle, *Against This Torrent* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1941), 39; and Edward Mead Earle, "National Defense and Political Science," *Political Science Quarterly* 55, no. 4 (December 1940): 490.
3. Yale Institute for International Studies to Rockefeller Foundation, "Report for the Year 1940–41," Box 4, YIIS.
4. Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2007), 18, 124, 463, 465–70.
5. Earle, *Against This Torrent*, 33–36; and Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, 472.

6. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, 64, 121.
7. Quincy Wright to Edward Mead Earle, August 19, 1940, Box 19, QW.
8. Edward Mead Earle, "Power Politics and American World Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 58, no. 1 (March 1943): 104.
9. Arnold Wolfers, "Anglo-American Post-war Coöperation and the Interests of Europe," *American Political Science Review* 36, no. 6 (August 1942): 666, Box 21, AW.
10. In 1944 and 1945, Earle consulted for the State Department's Division of International Security and Organization. Yale Institute members David Rowe and Grayson Kirk served as American representatives to the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences that set up the U.N. See Box 25, EME; Yale Institute for International Studies to Rockefeller Foundation, "Report for the Year 1944–45," Box 4, YIIS; and Ryan Irwin, "One World? Rethinking America's Margins, 1935–1945," in *Foreign Policy at the Periphery: The Shifting Margins of US International Relations since World War II*, ed. Bevan Sewell and Maria Ryan (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2016), 152–71.
11. George Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations: Strategy, Politics, and International Organization, 1914–1919* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 92–94; and Peter Yearwood, *Guarantee of Peace: The League of Nations in British Policy, 1914–1925* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 123.
12. Interpreting the U.N. as a device for maintaining order and peace among states are Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Robert Hildebrand, *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the U.N.* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); Daniel Plesch, *America, Hitler and the UN: How the Allies Won World War II and Forged a Peace* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011); and Stephen Schlesinger, *Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2003). Arguing instead that U.S. elites sought primarily to promote capitalism and counterrevolution are Patrick Hearden, *Architects of Globalism: Building a New World Order during World War II* (Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 2002), 175–200; and Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1945* (New York: Random House, 1968), ch. 18.
13. A prominent exchange between the two schools is Robert Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 39–51; and John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994–1995): 5–49.
14. For a critique within the field that recovers the approaches of political scientists in the mid-twentieth century and proposes research on the relationship between international organization and domestic politics, see Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 729–57.
15. Political Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. P-A5, February 19, 1941, CFRWPS.
16. Political Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. P-A6, March 7, 1941, CFRWPS.

17. Political Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. P-A10, May 22, 1941, CFRWPS.
18. Wendell Willkie, *One World* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1943).
19. Territorial Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. T-A14, June 17, 1941, CFRWPS.
20. Economic and Financial Group, "Methods of Economic Collaboration: Introductory—The Role of the Grand Area in American Economic Policy," Memorandum, No. E-B34, July 24, 1941, CFRWPS.
21. Economic and Financial Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. E-A17, June 14, 1941, CFRWPS.
22. Territorial Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. T-A14. See also Economic and Financial Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. E-A16, May 17, 1941, CFRWPS.
23. Eric Helleiner, *Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 124-25.
24. Lynn Edminster, "Foreign Trade and the World Crisis," *Department of State Bulletin* 4, no. 100 (May 24, 1941): 625.
25. Economic and Financial Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. E-A17.
26. Economic and Financial Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. E-A15, April 12, 1941, CFRWPS.
27. Helleiner, *Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods*, 124-27.
28. On the connection between the War and Peace Studies project and the creation of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, see G. William Domhoff, *The Power Elite and the State: How Policy Is Made in America* (New York: A. De Gruyter, 1990), ch. 6; and Laurence Shoup and William Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), 166-69.
29. Economic and Financial Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. E-A16.
30. Economic and Financial Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. E-A22, September 20, 1941, CFRWPS.
31. Economic and Financial Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. E-A22.
32. Hearden, *Architects of Globalism*; Thomas J. McCormick, *America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), esp. 28-33; and Laurence Shoup and William Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust*.
33. Economic and Financial Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. E-A16.
34. See, for example, Economic and Financial Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. E-A16; and Territorial Group, Memoranda of Discussions, No. T-A14.
35. Territorial Group, Memoranda of Discussions, No. T-A14.
36. Economic and Financial Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. E-A16.
37. Territorial Group, Memoranda of Discussions, No. T-A12, April 21, 1941, CFRWPS.
38. Political Group, Memoranda of Discussions, No. P-A12, June 25, 1941, CFRWPS.
39. Political Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. P-A5.

40. Division of Special Research, "Problems of Study Regarding Post-war Political Reconstruction," Division of Special Research, July 12, 1941, Box 11, NF.
41. Sumner Welles, "An Association of Nations," address at the dedication of the Norwegian Legation, July 22, 1941, Box 195, SW.
42. Adolf Berle, diary, July 23, 1941, Box 213, AB.
43. Arthur Sweetser, Political Group, "Approaches to Postwar International Organization," Memorandum, No. P-B30, September 17, 1941, CFRWPS.
44. Sweetser, Political Group, "Approaches to Postwar International Organization," Memorandum, No. P-B30, emphasis in the original.
45. Political Group, Memoranda of Discussions, No. P-A12.
46. Francis P. Miller to Hamilton Fish Armstrong, October 2, 1941, Box 74, HFA.
47. Territorial Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. T-A18, October 8, 1941, CFRWPS.
48. Report of the Twenty-Fourth Special Meeting, Research Sub-Committee on International Organisation, British Foreign Research and Press Service, Balliol College, Oxford, July 18, 1941, Box 3, WS.
49. "Johnson Says Alliance Forged by Peace Aims," *Los Angeles Times*, August 20, 1941.
50. Robert A. Taft, "Radio Broadcast to the Citizens of Ohio," August 29, 1941, in Clarence E. Wunderlin Jr., ed., *The Papers of Robert A. Taft*, vol. 2, 1939-1942, 284.
51. 87 Cong. Rec. A4363 (September 25, 1941).
52. John Foster Dulles, "Long Range Peace Objectives Including an Analysis of the Roosevelt-Churchill Eight Point Declaration," Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace, Federal Council of Churches, September 18, 1941, Box 282, JFD.
53. John Foster Dulles to John McNeill, October 1, 1941, quoted in Ronald W. Pruessen, *John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power* (New York: Free Press, 1982), 210-11.
54. Walter Lippmann, "The Beginning of the Road," *New York Herald Tribune*, September 11, 1941.
55. Political Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. P-A14, August 26, 1941, CFRWPS.
56. Political Group, "A Comparative Analysis of the Wilsonian and Roosevelt-Churchill Peace Programs," Memorandum, No. P-B32, December 3, 1941, CFRWPS, emphasis in the original.
57. Political Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. P-A14.
58. Political Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. P-A14.
59. William Paton to Arnold J. Toynbee, September 26, 1941, Box 119, AJT.
60. Arthur Sweetser to the Board of Directors of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, October 7, 1941, Box 5, WWF. See also the proceedings from a conference of League of Nations supporters held September 2-13, 1941: *World Organization: A Balance Sheet of the First Great Experiment* (Washington, DC: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942).
61. Armaments Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. A-A16, October 22, 1941, CFRWPS. See also Grayson Kirk, "International Policing (A Survey of Recent Proposals)," Draft Memorandum, September 27, 1941, Box 72, HFA.

62. Economic and Financial Group, Memoranda of Discussions, No. E-A21, October 11, 1941, CFRWPS.
63. Political Group, Memoranda of Discussions, No. P-A16, October 15, 1941, CFRWPS.
64. Freda Kirchwey, "Luce Thinking," *The Nation*, March 1, 1941, 229.
65. Thomas, "How to Fight for Democracy," 59.
66. "A War for Sea Power," *Christian Century*, April 16, 1941, 520-21.
67. Norman Thomas, "How to Fight for Democracy," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 216 (July 1941): 58.
68. Freda Kirchwey, "Luce Thinking," 230.
69. Max Lerner, "American Leadership in a Harsh Age," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 216 (July 1941): 123.
70. Political Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. P-A15, September 17, 1941, CFRWPS; and Armaments Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. A-A14, September 10, 1941, CFRWPS.
71. American Institute of Public Opinion Poll, August 26, 1941, in Hadley Cantril, *Public Opinion, 1935-1946* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951), 1083.
72. Another 10 percent of respondents "said they could name a provision but didn't give any answer." American Institute of Public Opinion Poll, August 26, 1941, and American Institute of Public Opinion Poll, January 23, 1941, in Cantril, *Public Opinion*, 1083.
73. For example, William Hard, "American Relations with Britain," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 216 (July 1941): 151.
74. Adolf Berle, diary, April 30, 1941, Box 212, AB.
75. "America First Will Dissolve; Urges War Aid," *Chicago Tribune*, December 12, 1941; and Wayne Cole, *America First: The Battle against Intervention, 1940-1941* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1953) 195.
76. Albert Guérard to James Shotwell, January 20, 1942, Box 231, JS; and James Shotwell to Albert Guérard, January 27, 1942, Box 231, JS.
77. Roger S. Greene to Clyde Eagleton, October 23, 1941, Box 5, QW.
78. Rapporteur Summary, Conference on North Atlantic Relations, Session 5, September 6, 1941, Box 11, EME. The conference, held September 4-9, 1941, was a nongovernmental expression of American-British partnership; it brought U.S. academics, officials, and foundation leaders together with such British and Canadian counterparts as postwar planner Charles Webster and international lawyer Hersh Lauterpacht. For proceedings, see *Documents: Conference on North Atlantic Relations* (Princeton, NJ: American Committee for International Studies, 1941).
79. Political Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. P-A18, December 9, 1941, CFRWPS.
80. James Shotwell, "After the War," *International Conciliation* 21, no. 376 (January 1942): 34.
81. Sweetser, Political Group, "Approaches to Postwar International Organization," Memorandum, No. P-B30.

82. 87 Cong. Rec. 8594 (November 7, 1941).
83. "America First Will Dissolve; Urges War Aid"; Cole, *America First*, 193–96; and Justus Doenecke, *Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939–1941* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 320–22.
84. Isaiah Bowman to Hamilton Fish Armstrong, December 15, 1941, Box 74, HFA.
85. "Advisory Committee on Post-war Foreign Policy: Preliminaries," n.d., Box 54, HN.
86. Advisory Committee, Chronological Minutes 1, Meeting of February 12, 1942, Box 54, HN.
87. Hearden, *Architects of Globalism*, 156. Welles's regular meetings with Roosevelt are documented in the folder titled Talks with FDR, 1942–1944, Box 54, HN.
88. Sumner Welles, Address at Memorial Services at the Tomb of President Wilson in the Washington Cathedral, November 11, 1941, Box 195, SW.
89. Subcommittee on International Organization, Chronological Minutes 4, Meeting of August 14, 1942, Box 85, HN.
90. Subcommittee on Political Problems, Chronological Minutes 2, Meeting of March 14, 1942, Box 55, HN.
91. Leo Pasvolksky to Cordell Hull, "Proposal for the Organization of Work for the Formulation of Post-war Foreign Policies," September 12, 1941, Box 54, HN.
92. The planning committee contained a range of officials across government departments, including, from the State Department, Dean Acheson, Adolf Berle, Herbert Feis, Harley Notter, and Leo Pasvolksky; from Roosevelt's staff, Benjamin Cohen and David Niles; and from Vice President Henry Wallace's Board of Economic Warfare, Milo Perkins. See Christopher O'Sullivan, *Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937–1943* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 64–70.
93. Subcommittee on Political Problems, Chronological Minutes 3, Meeting of March 21, 1942, Box 55, HN.
94. Subcommittee on Political Problems, Chronological Minutes 2.
95. Advisory Committee, Chronological Minutes 1.
96. Subcommittee on Political Problems, Chronological Minutes 4, Meeting of March 28, 1942, Box 55, HN.
97. Subcommittee on Political Problems, Chronological Minutes 9, Meeting of May 2, 1942, Box 55, HN.
98. Subcommittee on International Organization, Document 2, James Shotwell, "Preliminary Draft on International Organization," July 31, 1942, Box 86, HN.
99. Subcommittee on Political Problems, Chronological Minutes 1, Meeting of March 7, 1942, Box 55, HN, emphasis in the original.
100. Subcommittee on Political Problems, Chronological Minutes 3.
101. Subcommittee on Political Problems, Chronological Minutes 4.
102. Subcommittee on International Organization, Chronological Minutes 2, Meeting of July 31, 1942, Box 85, HN.

103. Subcommittee on International Organization, Chronological Minutes 2; and Subcommittee on International Organization, Chronological Minutes 4.
104. Subcommittee on International Organization, Chronological Minutes 2; and Subcommittee on International Organization, Chronological Minutes 3, August 7, 1942, Box 85, HN.
105. Subcommittee on International Organization, Chronological Minutes 5, August 21, 1942, Box 85, HN.
106. On U.S. planning with respect to colonial empire, see Hearden, *Architects of Globalism*, 93–146; William Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pt. 2; O'Sullivan, *Sumner Welles*, chs. 4–5; and Neil Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), ch. 13.
107. Subcommittee on Territorial Problems, Document 214-c, "Tentative Views of the Territorial Subcommittee (March 7, 1942–March 5, 1943)," March 10, 1943, Box 54, HN. See also the first plan drawn up for international trusteeship: Subcommittee on Political Problems, Document 118, "An International Trusteeship for Non-Self-Governing Peoples," October 22, 1942, Box 56, HN.
108. "Talks with FDR," January 2, 1943, Box 54, HN.
109. Leo Pasvolosky, "Notes on a Meeting at the White House," February 3, 1944, Box 5, LP, quoted in Hearden, *Architects of Globalism*, 167.
110. Subcommittee on Political Problems, Chronological Minutes 5, Meeting of April 4, 1942, Box 55, HN.
111. Sumner Welles, *Seven Decisions That Shaped History* (New York: Harper, 1951), 133.
112. In May, for instance, CFR president Norman H. Davis spoke with Roosevelt and reported to other members of the Subcommittee on Security Problems that the president's mind was "already pretty well made up": the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China must control the postwar settlement alone. Subcommittee on Security Problems, Chronological Minutes 4, Meeting of May 20, 1942, Box 76, HN. See also Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 342, 389–90.
113. FDR-Molotov Conference, May 29, 1942, *FRUS: Diplomatic Papers, 1942*, vol. 3, *Europe*, 568–69.
114. O'Sullivan, *Sumner Welles*, 72–73; and Benjamin Welles, *Sumner Welles: FDR's Global Strategist: A Biography* (New York: St. Martin's, 1997), 334.
115. Subcommittee on International Organization, Document 123-e, "Draft Constitution of the International Organization," March 26, 1943, Box 88, HN.
116. Hoopes and Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the U.N.*, 52–54.
117. Franklin D. Roosevelt, quoted in Warren F. Kimball, "The Sheriffs: FDR's Postwar World," in *FDR's World: War, Peace, and Legacies*, ed. David B. Woolner, Warren F. Kimball, and David Reynolds (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 100.
118. Churchill entertained a variety of ideas and had proposed to endorse "effective international organization" in the Atlantic Charter, but in 1942 and 1943 he landed on

a regionalist solution featuring a Council of Europe with an international police force. E. J. Hughes, "Winston Churchill and the Formation of the United Nations Organization," *Journal of Contemporary History* 9, no. 4 (October 1974): 177–94.

119. Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy*, 519–22.

120. Kimball, "The Sheriffs," 100.

121. Raymond Leslie Buell to C. L. Stillman, March 31, 1942, Box 24, RLB.

122. Milo Perkins to Harry Hopkins, December 1, 1942, Box 329, HH.

5. THE DEBATE THAT WASN'T, 1942–1945

1. Toynbee made the trip in his capacity as a semiofficial British postwar planner with the Foreign Research and Press Service, based in Balliol College, Oxford. He was research director of Chatham House from 1925 to 1955. Summarizing Toynbee's career is Christopher Brewin, "Arnold Toynbee, Chatham House, and Research in a Global Context," in *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Interwar Idealism Revisited*, ed. David Long and Peter Wilson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), ch. 11. See also Ian Hall, "Time of Troubles: Arnold J. Toynbee's Twentieth Century," *International Affairs* 90, no. 1 (2014): 23–36; and William H. McNeill, *Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

2. Arnold J. Toynbee, "Visit to the United States, 23rd August to 20th October, 1942," Box 92, AJT.

3. Toynbee, "Visit to the United States."

4. Henry Wallace, *The Price of Free World Victory* (New York: L. B. Fischer, 1942). For pronouncements on colonialism by Wallace and others in 1942, and British reactions, see Lloyd Gardner, "FDR and the Colonial Question," in *FDR's World: War, Peace, and Legacies*, ed. David B. Woolner, Warren F. Kimball, and David Reynolds (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 123–27; and James P. Hubbard, *The United States and the End of British Colonial Rule in Africa, 1941–1968* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2011), 11–14, 30. On Anglo-American negotiations over Lend-Lease compensation, see Patrick Hearden, *Architects of Globalism: Building a New World Order during World War II* (Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 2002), 28–32, 42–46, 64–91, 247–49, 314–15; and Warren F. Kimball, *The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), ch. 3. The classic work is Richard N. Gardner, *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American Collaboration in the Reconstruction of Multilateral Trade* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956).

5. Toynbee, "Visit to the United States."

6. Robert Divine, *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America during World War II* (New York: Atheneum, 1967). "Second chance" became a trope starting in 1941 as part of the teleological argument that the United States had passed up the opportunity for global supremacy in World War I, as though many Americans at the time advocated supremacy but were thwarted by other Americans. See Charlotte Burnett Mahon, ed., *Our Second Chance* (New York: Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 1944); Henry Wallace, "America's Second Chance," April 8, 1941, in *Prefaces to Peace* (New York: Simon and Schuster/Doubleday/Doran/Reynal and Hitchcock/Columbia University Press, 1943), 363–64; and John Boardman Whitton, ed., *The Second Chance: America and the Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1944).

7. Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 160.
8. Dorothy B. Robins, *Experiment in Democracy: The Story of U.S. Citizen Organizations in Forging the Charter of the United Nations* (New York: Parkside, 1971).
9. For Taft's speech announcing his vote in favor of ratifying the U.N. Charter, see 91 Cong. Rec. 8151–58 (July 28, 1945).
10. See Joseph Baratta, *The Politics of World Federation* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), esp. 54–61; and Jon Yoder, "The United World Federalists: Liberals for Law and Order," in *Peace Movements in America*, ed. Charles Chatfield (New York: Schocken, 1973), 95–115.
11. Examining the early Cold War, John Fousek documents a globalist outlook in public discourse, namely in the Truman administration, the mass print media, organized labor, and the African American community. Only in the African American press does he find significant disagreement over America's global role. John Fousek, *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). On black internationalism in World War II, see Penny von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Gerald Horne, *Facing the Rising Sun: African Americans, Japan, and the Rise of Afro-Asian Solidarity* (New York: New York University Press, 2018); James Meriwether, *Proudly We Can Be Africans: Black Americans and Africa, 1935–1961* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), ch. 2; Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 83–166; and Nico Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), esp. 125–60.
12. Harry S. Truman, "Radio Report to the American People on the Potsdam Conference," August 9, 1945, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/97/radio-report-american-people-potsdam-conference>.
13. "A Plan of Action for Woodrow Wilson Foundation: Fisdale [*sic*] Report on Program and Policy," 1942, Box 21, WWF.
14. "A Plan of Action."
15. On Freudianism in twentieth-century American popular culture, see Lawrence Samuel, *Shrink: A Cultural History of Psychoanalysis in America* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2013).
16. "A Plan of Action."
17. Charlotte Burnett Mahon, "Annual Report of the Foundation, 1943–1944," April 1944, Box 1, WWF; Charlotte Burnett Mahon, ed., *Our Second Chance* (New York: Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 1944); Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee, June 13, 1944, Box 1, WWF; and Memorandum on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, December 4, 1944, Box 5, WWF. On the film *Wilson*, see Thomas J. Knock, "History with Lightning: The Forgotten Film *Wilson*," *American Quarterly* 28, no. 5 (Winter 1976): 523–43.
18. Louise Wright, "Comments on Recommendations of the Committee on Policy and Awards," April 17, 1942, Box 1, WWF.