The rigid distinction between discovery and justification has an important theoretical function: it provides ground for a decisionmaking theory within a positivistic Jurisprudence. In the 20th Century scholars drew on the scientific debate and used this rigid distinction between discovery and justification to deal with other dualisms in legal theory, such as objective/subjective, arbitrary/rational, descriptive/normative.

 

The main problem of my research is: the rigidity of the distinction between discovery and justification does not hold. Moreover, when we step back and remove the rigid distinction the other dualisms blur – thus collapsing the structure that supports highly objective theories of the law.

 

The main hypothesis of my research is: if we further our understanding of the relations between discovery and justification we can be better equipped to understand how the other dualisms operate in the legal context. Finally, I support that Bernard Lonergan’s theories can help us in achieving this further understanding.