European Young Lawyers
Remoteness of Damages in Delictual Liability
A Comparative Study of the different Approaches
in the Scottish and German Legal Systems
Table of Contents
A. The Concept of Remote Damages in
An Outline of the Topic and ist Limits
Rules about Remoteness of Damages in Delict and Contract
2. Remoteness of Damages as
opposed to Remoteness of Injuries
The Question of Remote Damages in the Structure of Delictual Liability and
Reasons for Developing the Concept of Remote Damages
Criteria in order to determine the Remoteness of Damages
1. The Obiter Dictum of Lord Kinloch
2. Reasonable Foreseeability or Natural and Direct Consequences
3. Remote Damages and Intentional Delicts
The Classical English Cases
1. Re Polemis
2. The Wagon Mound No.1
Scottish Cases regarding Remote Damages
1. Baron Vernon v. The Metagama
2. Hughes v. Lord Advocate
3. Campbell v. F&F Moffat (Transport) Ltd.
4. Summary of Scottish Cases
Personal Injuries as an Exception: The Thin-Skull Principle
B. The Approach to the Issue of Remote Damages in German Law
Zurechenbarkeit“ as Counterpart to the Concept of Remote
2. „Lehre vom Schutzzweck der Norm
Typical Example Cases
The Thin-Skull Rule in German Law
The Concept of Remote Damages in Scots Law
An Outline of the Topic and its Limits
The purpose of the rules about remote damages is to prevent somebody who
is in breach of a duty - be it delictual or contractual - to be held liable
indefinitely and without any limitations for any and all harmful consequences
that arise from his
breach of duty. Before looking in detail
at the theoretical approach to remote damages as a
method of achieving this, it seems useful to point out a few related
issues and in why they have to be distinguished from the topic of remote damages
Rules about Remoteness of Damages in Delict and Contract
The issue of remote damages can arise not only in the context of
delictual liability, but anywhere in the legal system where a liability for
damages can arise. Besides in delict this would be in contract. In both delict
and contract generally the pursuer must not only show that the defender’s
action caused the damages he suffered, but in addition he must also prove that
these damages are not too remote. However, because of the different nature of
contractual and delictual duties, the rules about the remoteness of damages are
different in delict and contract. Basically, there are different tests in the
law of delict and the law of contract in order to determine the sufficient
remoteness of the damages in question.
In this paper only the rules about remote damages in delict will be discussed.
Remoteness of Damages as opposed to Remoteness of Injuries
Slightly older literature and cases sometimes make a point of
distinguishing between remote injuries and remote damages.
These two must not be confused. Both deal with different relations in which the
question of remoteness can come up.
In order to receive damages, the pursuer has to show the chain of
causation. This consists of two individual steps: There has to be a causal
connection between the defender’s original conduct and the injury suffered as
a consequence thereof, as well as between the caused harm and the losses arising
out of it. In each of those two steps the question of remoteness can arise. In
addition to the factual causation in the sense of a conditio
sine qua non,
the necessary proximity between original conduct and injury respectively injury
and loss has to be established.
Regarding the connection between the injury and the arising loss the
question arises if the damages are too remote. On the other hand, regarding the
connection between the defender’s original conduct and the consequential
injury the arising question is if the injuries are too remote. In other words,
the term remote injuries refers to the proximity respectively remoteness of the
injuries in relation to the original conduct. However, although the issues of
remote injuries and remote damages therefore obviously are related and even
parallel in many aspects, there is a major difference: If an injury is too
remote to be legally connected with the defender’s original conduct, as a
consequence the defender cannot be held liable at all. The concept of remoteness
of injuries is therefore used to determine the existence of any liability on the
part of the defender.
Contrary to this, remoteness of damage is concerned with the extent of liability
once it has been established.
The more recent literature seemingly does not consider the concepts of
remoteness of injury and remoteness of damage to be necessarily connected. The
problem of remote injuries now obviously is sometimes seen as an aspect of the
delictual duty of care. Instead of enquiring if the injuries in a certain case
are too remote to be considered legally connected with the defender’s conduct,
Thomson suggests to rather discuss if
the defender actually owed the pursuer such an extensive duty of care as to
prevent those remote injuries.
Anyhow, the concept of remote injuries respectively the possible extent
of a duty of care to prevent remote injuries shall not be discussed in this
The Question of Remote Damages in the Structure of Delictual Liability
and Reasons for Developing the Concept of Remote Damages
The question whether a loss is too remotely connected to the injury is
logically subordinate to the question of remoteness of the injury itself. Only
after it has been determined that the injury itself is causally connected to the
defender’s original conduct and is not too remote, i.e.
that the defender can generally be held liable, can the question arise if the
damages are too remotely connected with the injury and if because of this in
spite of his general liability the defender cannot be held liable for those
This question of remoteness of damages arises - just like the question of
remoteness of injuries - in the context with the causal connection, in this case
the causal nexus
between the injury and the suffered losses. Just like the conduct must be a conditio
sine qua non (a natural cause) and also the causa causans (the legal cause) for the injury,
the same principle applies basically for the connection between the injury and
Naturally, the losses must be causally connected in the sense of a conditio
sine qua non with the suffered injury. Otherwise, the defender cannot
possibly be held liable for them. However, the consequences of the suffered
injury may extend very far, strictly logically speaking ad infinitum. It does not seem fair nor is it practicable, though,
to impose on the defender a duty of reparation for any harmful consequence that
is in any way somehow causally connected to his conduct.
The concept of remote damages therefore serves to restrict the possible scope of
damages that the defender can be held liable for. So in order for the pursuer to
recover losses from the defender, these losses do not only have to be causally
connected to the injury in terms of a factual causation, but in addition the
damages must not be too remote from the injury.
There are different ways of determining whether a damage is actually too
remote to be recovered. Those shall be discussed later on. However, the general
purpose of all methods is to introduce an element of evaluation into the process
of determining if in this individual case it seems fair to burden the defender
with the respective damages. In
other words, liability can only arise where there is a factual causation as well
as a sufficient proximity between the injury and the consequential losses.
This necessary proximity sometimes is also considered to be the „legal
Criteria in order to determine the Remoteness of Damages
Although there is unanimous agreement on the fact that damages do not
only have to be causally connected but also must not be too remote from the
injury, there are different opinions on how it should be determined if a damage
actually is too remote to be recovered from the defender.
The Obiter Dictum of Lord Kinloch
From a Scottish perspective, the most commonly cited
classical authority in this area is a statement by Lord Kinloch in Allan
v. Barclay from the year 1864:
„The grand rule on the subject of damages is, that none can be claimed
except such as naturally and directly arise out of the wrong done; and such,
therefore, as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the view of the
Walker points out that this
statement was made with regard to the existence rather than the extent of
liability and therefore with regard to the remoteness of injuries rather than to
the remoteness of damages.
It seems possible, however, that at the time of the statement, almost 150 years
ago, it was not always clearly distinguished between the remoteness of damages
and that of injuries. In any case, the remark has been referred to in Scottish
cases concerning the question of remoteness of damages as recently as 1992
and therefore in spite of Walker’s
opinion seems to be part of the Scottish law concerning remote damages.
Reasonable Foreseeability or Natural and Direct Consequence
Quite impressively, although almost 150 years old, Lord Kinloch’s
statement already includes elements of both tests for remoteness of damages that
are currently still in use. In the first part, it suggests a direct and natural
consequences test, whereas in the end it introduces the reasonable foresight of
the defender as a criterion for determining the remoteness of a damage.
Therefore Lord Kinloch has actually referred to a mixture of the two tests that
are still discussed and applied today.
Walker lists the different
formulations of the foreseeability test according to which the defender is
„for the natural and probable consequences of his wrongful conduct,
or possibly for the foreseeable consequences,
those which he should reasonably have foreseen as necessary consequences
of his wrongful conduct.“
According to the second established test for remoteness of damages, the
defender is liable for all the consequences which arise directly from his
Remote Damages and Intentional Delicts
The concept of not holding somebody liable for the damages he has caused
because the damages are „too remote“, be it because they are considered as
not reasonably foreseeable or not directly arising from his conduct, is only
applied to the delictual liability for unintentional, i.e. negligent conduct.
It does not fit cases in which the defender actually intended to hurt the
pursuer and to cause the damage. In those cases there is no need to limit the
extent of his liability by using the concept of remote damages.
The classical English Cases
In England the issue has been litigated to a greater extent than in
Scotland and the law of England seems to have settled for a foreseeability test.
However, this test has not always been applied. Even in England,
originally the view was taken that once a breach of duty was established the
only question remaining was whether the injury and loss were a direct
consequence of the breach of duty of care, whereas it did not matter whether the
injury and consequential loss was reasonably foreseeable as a result of this
breach of duty. The classic
authority for this view was the case Re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co Ltd , decided by the Court of
Appeal in the year 1921.
In this case, the charterers of a ship had loaded it with petrol. While
docked at the port of Casablanca, servants of the charterers carelessly allowed
a plank to fall into the hold of the ship. The falling plank struck something
and thereby caused a spark which in its turn ignited petrol vapour in the hold.
The vapour caused a fire which destroyed the whole ship.
Not surprisingly, the court held that the fire was not a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of allowing the plank to fall. However, it was
reasonably foreseeable that the falling plank would cause some form of damage to
the vessel. Because of this, the court established the defenders’ negligence
and their general delictual liability. Regarding the extent of the recoverable
damages the court then held that whether the particular damage caused by the
fire was recoverable depended solely on it being a direct consequence of the
negligent act. Although the damage by fire could not have reasonably been
foreseen as a consequence of dropping the plank, the defenders were therefore
liable for the loss of the ship by fire.
The Wagon Mound No.1
Re Polemis was not followed by
the Privy Council a few decades later, though, in the case Overseas
Tankship (UK) Ltd v. Morts Dock and Engineering Co. Ltd ,
commonly called The Wagon Mound No.1.
Again, in this case a ship was being loaded with oil in a dock owned by
Morts, the respondents. As a result
of the carelessness of some servants of the appellants, Overseas Tankship, some
oil spilt into the harbour, while some workmen from Morts were welding nearby.
The welding was suspended for a while but later was allowed to continue. At some
point, some molten metal from the welding fell into the water. It set fire to a
piece of debris that was floating on the oil. This set the oil on fire which in
turn caused severe damage to the wharf.
The Privy Council found that it was foreseeable that the oil spillage
would cause some harm to the wharf, namely fouling of the dock and therefore
established the negligence and consequential general delictual liability of the
appellants. However, the Privy Council held that the appellants could not
reasonably be expected to know that the (particularly thick) oil could be set on
fire in such a way and that therefore - in spite of the damage being a direct
and natural consequence of the negligent act - the damages caused by the
unforeseeable fire were not recoverable. To hold somebody liable for each and
any direct and natural consequence of his acts, to the court did
„not seem consonant with current
ideas of justice or morality...“
in addition the Privy Council found that
„It is a principle of civil liability...that a man
must be considered responsible for the probable consequences of his act. To
demand more of him is too harsh a rule.“
Scottish Cases regarding Remote Damages
There have not been very many Scottish cases in which the question of
remote damages has been discussed. However,
there are a few cases in which the concept of remote damages plays a role.
No simple and clear solution to the Scots law regarding remote damages
emerges from those cases, though. On the other hand, in McKillen
v. Barclay Curle & Co. Ltd the
judges made it very clear that at any rate, the law established in the English
cases does not apply in Scotland.
Baron Vernon v. The Metagama
Strangely enough, this case again involves ships. There had been a
collision on the River Clyde between two ships, the Baron Vernon and the
Metagama, for which the defenders, the owners of the Baron Vernon, admitted
being responsible. In spite of
this, they refused to accept their responsibility for the subsequent damage to
the Baron Vernon. The Baron Vernon
had been towed and tied to the beach at one position from which it slipped off
and was afterwards tied up at a different position under the supervision of a
third party. From this second position it was later carried away by the tide and
This case is a very nice example of the fact that really the question of
remoteness of damage is an aspect of the question of causation.
In the decision it was considered if there was in fact a nova
causa, which would have interrupted the chain of causation. This was not
found to be the case, however. Instead
it was stated that
„...the damage is recoverable...if it is the natural and reasonable
result of the negligent act, and it will assume that character
if it can be shown to be such a consequence as in the ordinary course of things
would flow from the situation which the offending ship created.“
glance, this seems to establish the direct and natural consequences test for
Scotland. When taking a closer
look, though, one notices that the result instead of „direct and natural“
has to be „natural and reasonable.“ It is difficult enough to determine
which results are direct and natural. However,
what kind of consequence could be a „reasonable“ consequence? A consequence
in the cases were the concept of remote damages comes up, is a matter of fact
and no one chose for it to happen - it happened by chance or coincidence. In
this context it does not seem appropriate to use the expression „reasonable“
to describe such a consequence. On the contrary, the use of this expression
hints at the importance of human expectations. Probably, what the judges
actually meant to say was that one should only be accountable for results that
one could reasonably expect. This way of interpreting the first part of the
sentence is actually supported by its ending, because results that one can
reasonably expect are exactly those that flow from the situation in an ordinary
course of things.
Hughes v. Lord Advocate
Some decades later, in Hughes v.
Lord Advocate, the House of Lords in a decision regarding a Scottish case,
referred to The Wagon Mound and its
ruling that remote damages are only recoverable if they were foreseeable for the
defender as if this was Scots law. In
this case, workers employed by the Post Office dug a manhole in a public street
to work on some telephone cables. In the afternoon before leaving the site, they
secured the manhole and placed paraffin lamps as warning around it. After they
had left, two young boys started to play in the manhole. They caused one of the
paraffin lamps to fall into the hole. This in turn caused a huge explosion
because of which one of the boys fell into the manhole and suffered severe
burnings. The explosion was caused by vapour of some paraffin that had escaped
when the lamp fell into the hole which was ignited by the flame. Such an
occurrence was found to be unforeseeable.
Lord Pearce stated that
„the defenders are, therefore, liable for all the
foreseeable consequences of their neglect.“
here only the foreseeability test is referred to and there is no mentioning of
remote damages having to be the direct and natural result.
Campbell v. F&F Moffat (Transport) Ltd.
Surprisingly, in the rather recent case Campbell
v. F&F Moffat, the judge did not refer at all to Lord Pearce´s remark
in Hughes v. Lord Advocate.
In this case, a man’s employment at a mill was terminated in 1989
because of a road traffic accident which left him unable to work there anymore.
Two years later, the mill was closed and all employees received redundancy
payments. The man then wanted to recover the damage that he suffered because he
was not employed at the mill anymore at the time of its closure and therefore
was not entitled to the redundancy payment. The question was then if this damage
was too remote.
Regarding the concept of recoverable remote damages, the court referred
to Lord Kinloch´s over a century old statementand without any mentioning
of the two cases described above held very clearly,
„that the question was not one of
foreseeability but whether the damage claimed arose naturally and directly out
of the wrong done.“
Summary of Scottish Cases
It is not easy to summarise these cases in order to find an easy and
straightforward formulation as to
what actually is the Scots law in this respect. Scottish Courts seem to use a
mixture of the direct and natural consequences test and the test of reasonable
foreseeability. However, in the vast majority of cases there virtually will be
not difference in the practical outcome. Both tests require an evaluation of
either what consequence is regarded to be „direct and natural“ or
Personal Injuries as an Exception: The Thin-Skull Principle
In English as well as in Scots law in cases regarding personal injuries,
however, an exception is made from the general rule. In England, the case Smith
v. Leech Brain & Co.established an exception
to the general rule set down in the Wagon Mound. For Scotland, this was already held in 1942 in Bourhill
v. Young’s Executor,
where regarding personal injuries Lord Wright stated - although only obiter -
„...if the wrong is established, the wrongdoer must
take the victim as he finds him.“
classical case in Scotland regarding remoteness of damages in the context of
personal injuries is McKillen v. Barclay
Curle & Co. Ltd .
The pursuer McKillen, a plumber, fractured a rip when he slipped and fell
when descending some stairs at work. He sued his employer for damages on the
ground that the accident had been caused by the employer’s negligence. In the
first instance, he was awarded £ 600. The employer appealed this decision
because he thought the awarded damages were excessive. The judge had not only
taken the fractured rib into consideration, but also that the tuberculosis, from
which the pursuer had formerly suffered, was reactivated.
employer’s appeal was eventually successful, but only on the grounds that the
pursuer had not given satisfactory proof that the fracture of the rib had caused
the reactivation of his illness. Apart
from that, however, the First Division made it very clear that somebody who
injures another as consequence of his negligence
take his victim as he finds him, and if his victim has a weak heart and dies as
a result of the injury the negligent man is liable in damages for his death,
even although a normal man might only in the same circumstances have sustained a
relatively trivial injury...“
The Approach to the Issue of Remote Damages in German Law
As in Scots law, the German law differentiates between the connection
between the defender’s conduct and the injury suffered because of it („haftungsbegründender
Tatbestand“, meaning this connection actually establishes the liability of the
defender) and the connection between the suffered harm and the losses caused by
that („haftungsausfüllender Tatbestand“, meaning only if this connection
exists as well the defender can be held actually liable for the damages). So the
equivalent to the issue of remote damages in Scots law is the „haftungsausfüllender
Tatbestand“ in German law. The distinction is especially important because
there are different rules of proof for those steps of the causal chain, for „haftungsausfüllender
Tatbestand“ § 287 of the German Procedural Code (ZPO) applies, which
says that in the event that the pursuer cannot proof the exact amount of the
damages the court can estimate this. For the „haftungsbegründender Tatbestand“
a full proof by the pursuer according to § 286 ZPO is necessary.
The systematics of the chain of causation in German law is similar to the
Scottish one. It applies to both of the required causal connections, „haftungsbegründender“
and „haftungsausfüllender Tatbestand“. Just as in Scots law, the causation
itself is established if the first event is a conditio
sine qua non for the consequence, be it the injury or the damages.
„Objektive Zurechenbarkeit“ as German Counterpart to the Concept of
However, in order to limit liability so one cannot be held accountable
for each and every consequence arising out of one’s conduct, apart from the
„natural causation“ that is determined by the condition
sine qua non test (called „Äquivalenztheorie“ in German) the causation
chain also has to be evaluated to sort out totally unlikely consequences for
which the defender is not supposed to be responsible. For this purpose, another
theory has been developed according to which besides the natural causation, also
„objektive Zurechenbarkeit“ has to be established. This step is meant to
allow an evaluation of the events. This theory has been used by the courts since
1902 and consists of several sub-theories. The most used and accepted ones are
The general rule in this respect is the „Adäquanztheorie“ according
to which a defender is only responsible for consequences if „his original
conduct according to general life experience was not totally unlikely to cause such a
Just as in Scots law,
the consequence is never considered to be outside of „general life
experience“ if the defender actually intended it.
„Lehre vom Schutzzweck der Norm“
However, since the „general life experience“ rarely suggests that
some consequence is totally unlikely to happen, another theory has been
developed especially for delictual cases, called „Lehre vom Schutzzweck der
This can be translated into „theory about the protective scope of the violated
If damages are claimed because of a delict, the pursuer always has to
show that the defender violated some duty of care or has even committed an
offence. According to this theory, delictual damages cannot be claimed for
consequences that are outside the protective scope of this duty, i.e. if the
duty was not established to protect against this damages.
A frequently used example is the breaking of a speed limit. The speed
limit is intended to protect against risks that arise out of the higher speed
itself, e.g. that the car takes longer to come to a stand when braking etc..
However, the speed limit is not intended to protect against a certain car being
in a certain place at a specific moment. Therefore it is not possible to argue
that a driver who has broken the speed limit is liable because of delict if
there was no way that the driver could have avoided the accident even if he had
not speeded. The delictual liability cannot be founded on the argument that this
driver would not have reached the site of the accident at the time it happened
had he not broken the speed limit.
Typical Example Cases
The German legal system is a civilian one and instead of precedents works
with either general rules laid down in the legislation or theories that have
been developed by the academic profession and accepted by the courts. In spite
of this, though, there are certain so called „case groups.“ The cases of
such a group are all similar to each other and by looking at all of them
together a general rule regarding cases of this kind can be derived, so in this
way the case groups have a similar effect to precedents. Regarding the issue of
remote damages respectively „objektive Zurechenbarkeit,“ a number of case
Some of them shall be mentioned here as examples.
A damage is generally not considered to be an unlikely consequence
according to general life experience, just because it was not caused by the
defenders conduct alone but only because one or more other causes existed as
well. The defender’s conduct does not even have to be the main cause.
A damage for which the defender’s conduct is only an indirect cause can
generally be a consequence that is not unlikely according to general life
An example would be the case in which a person injured in an accident died later
on in the hospital because of a bacterial infection that he caught there.
The same is true for cases in which a third person acts after the
defender’s conduct. This is especially true for mistakes that a third person
makes while helping the pursuer after the defender’s damaging conduct.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that even in the case of a voluntary
action of the pursuer himself because of which he suffers some damage, the
defender may be held liable for this damage.
This case group consists mainly of cases in which the pursuer is hurt when
chasing a defender who has committed an offence.
The Thin-Skull Rule in German Law
Just as in Scots law
regarding personal injuries, the victims inclination to suffer more serious
consequences than the average person would have, does not affect the
defender’s responsibility for the damages to the extent in which the victim
has actually suffered them. However, there are some
limits to this general rule. For instance, the defender cannot be held liable
has not been held liable in a case when the victim had to have his leg amputated
after the defender had by mistake stepped on the victim’s foot.
It is almost stunning how similar the solutions to the problem are in
both the Scottish and the German legal system. In both systems, it can only be
determined if a damage is too remote in order for the defender to be held liable
for it through an evaluation of all the circumstances. There are no exact rules
and it will always be difficult to predict which result the court will reach. In
both legislations, the courts have to meet the challenge of actually doing both
parties justice without having clear rules at hand but rather by applying common
Enid A.: General Principles of
Scots Law, 7th Edition, Edinburgh, 1999.
J./ Potgieter, J.M./ Visser, P.J.: Law of
Delict, 3rd Edition, Durban, South Africa, 1999.
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 59th Edition, München, 2000
(cited as Palandt/respective author).
Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia:
The Laws of Scotland, Obligations, Volume 15, Edinburgh.
William J.: Delict and related
obligations, Edinburgh, 1993.
Delictual Liability, 2nd Edition, Edinburgh, 1999.
David M.: The Law of Delict in
Scotland, Vol.I, Edinburgh, 1966.
he, him, his etc. always refer to the female version as well.
Stewart, p. 71.
Stewart, p. 71; Koufos v. Czarnikow Ltd, The Heron II  1 A.C.
350 at page 385, 386; Stair
Encyclopaedia, Vol.15, Para 902.
Walker, p. 238, 239; Bourhill v. Young, 1943 SLT 105; Hughes v. Lord
Advocate, 1963 SLT 150.
expressions as in Neethling/Potgieter/Visser, p. 172 et consecutive.
Walker, p. 238.
Walker, p. 238.
Marshall, p. 368; Thomson, p. 127; Walker, p. 238.
Thomson, p. 127, 265.
Bourhill v. Young, 1943 SLT, 105, 111;
Walker, p. 251.
expression as in Neethling/Potgieter/Visser, p. 171.
Stewart, p. 64 et consecutive.
Liesbosch v. SS. Edison
 A.C. 449, 460; Walker, p.
Thomson, p. 265; Neethling/Potgieter/Visser, p. 171, 181, 182.
Neethling/Potgieter/Visser, p. 181, 182.
Thomson, p. 266; Stewart, p. 71; Stair Encyclopaedia, Vol.15, Para 908.
Allan v. Barclay (1864) 2 M. 873, 874.
Walker, p. 253.
Campbell v. F&F
Moffat (Transport) Ltd, 1992 SLT 962.
Stewart, p. 71; Thomson, p. 266; Stair Encyclopaedia, Vol. 15, para 908;
Walker, p. 253, 254.
Walker, p. 253.
Thomson, p. 269.
Stewart, p. 71, 73; Thomson, p. 266; Stair Encyclopaedia, Vol. 15,
Para 907; Koufos v. Czarnikow  1 AC 350, 351.
 3 KB 560.
 AC 388.
 AC 388 at pages
1967 SLT 41.
1967 SLT 41, at pages 42, 43 and 44/45.
Kelvin Shipping Co. , The Baron Vernon v. Canadian Pacific Railway
Co., The Metagama, 1928 SC 21.
1928 SC 21, at page 25.
1963 SLT 150.
1963 SLT 150, at page 156.
1992 SLT 962
see above at A III 1.
1992 SLT 962, at page 963.
Marshall, p. 368 and 369.
 2 QB 405.
1943 SLT 105.
1943 SLT 105, at page 110.
1967 SLT 41.
1967 SLT 41, at page 42.
see at A III 3.
German Federal Supreme Court („Bundesgerichtshof“, short BGH) at
BGHZ 1979, 262; German Federal Employment Court (BAG) at NJW 1990,
Palandt/Heinrichs, Vor § 249 no. 62.
BGH at VersR 1977, 524; BGH at NJW 1985, 1350; BGH at NJW 1988, 58.
 Compare Palandt/Heinrichs, Vor § 249 no. 66 et consecutive.
BGH at NJW 1990, 2883.
Palandt/Heinrichs, Vor § 249 no. 72.
German Supreme Court until 1945 („Reichsgericht“, short RG) at
RGZ 105, 264.
Palandt/Heinrichs, Vor § 249 no.73-76.
Palandt/Heinrichs, Vor § 249 no. 77-82.
see for instance BGH at NJW 1964, 1363 and at BGHZ 57, 25.
compare above at A VI.
Palandt/Heinrichs, Vor § 249 no. 67.
 High Court of Karlsruhe („Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe“) at VersR 1966, 741.